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Guarantor of Last Resort 
Kathryn Judge∗ 
The optimal response to a financial crisis entails addressing two, 
often conflicting, demands: stopping the panic and starting the clock. 
When short-term depositors flee, banks can be forced to sell assets at 
fire-sale prices, causing credit to contract and real economic activity 
to decline. To reduce these adverse spillover effects, policymakers 
routinely intervene to stop systemic runs. All too often, however, 
policymakers deploy stopgap measures that allow the underlying 
problems to fester. To promote long-term economic health, they must 
also ferret out the underlying problems and allocate the losses that 
cannot be avoided. A well-designed guarantor of last resort can help 
address these conflicting demands. Just-in-time guarantees keep 
private capital in the system, providing policymakers the time that 
they need to develop a viable plan to address deficiencies. A strict 
time limit on those guarantees ensures that policymakers and market 
participants remain motivated to devise such a plan, avoiding the 
alternative pitfall of excessive forbearance. 
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In wild periods of alarm, one failure makes many, and the best way to 
prevent the derivative failures is to arrest the primary failure which causes 
them. 
Walter Bagehot1 
 
How best to fight financial panics is a matter of ongoing debate. On 
the one hand, concerns about moral hazard abound. When bank depositors 
and other short-term creditors anticipate government protection, they have 
little incentive to undertake costly monitoring. This reduces market 
discipline and can lead to excessive risk taking. On the other hand, the 
government cannot credibly commit to a no-bailout policy.2 As Walter 
Bagehot recognized nearly 150 years ago, once panic sets in, the resulting 
harm extends far beyond the fleeing creditors and the institutions issuing 
their claims. Panics can lead to market dysfunction, credit contraction, and 
recession.3 The Great Depression vividly illustrates how ordinary 
Americans suffer when the government tries to force bankers to stew in 
 
1. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 51 
(1874). 
2. See Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 479, 482 (2015) (“Bailouts are socially desirable because Congress cannot 
anticipate the contingencies that would make possible an ex ante insurance system that regulates 
behavior and charges firms in advance for liquidity support or other transfers.”); Adam J. Levitin, 
In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2011) (“Bailouts are an inevitable feature of 
modern economies, in which the interconnectedness of firms means that the entire economy bears 
the risk of an individual firm’s failure.”); see also Jeremy Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial 
Stability Regulation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 57, 58 (2012) (showing that unregulated banks can issue too 
much short-term debt, setting the stage for runs and fire sales and that “the potential for such fire 
sales may give rise to a negative externality”). 
3. See infra subpart I(A). 
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their own juices.4 
The macroeconomic cost of financial panics helps to explain the 
massive system of ex ante regulation imposed on banks and standing 
government-guarantee programs like deposit insurance. These costs and 
imperfections in the current regulatory regime have also inspired a range of 
ambitious reform proposals. Some favor significantly expanding deposit 
insurance to cover virtually all short-term debt in the financial system.5 
Others favor a system that allows institutions that issue short-term debt to 
hold only the safest of assets, eliminating the traditional dual function of 
banks as takers of deposits and makers of loans.6 Each of these proposals is 
 
4. Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the 
Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 257 (1983) (showing that allowing banks to fail 
played a central role in depressing credit creation and magnifying the size of the recession known 
as the Great Depression); Gene Smiley, Great Depression, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GreatDepression.html [https://perma.cc/M3N7-PZ22] 
(explaining that “[b]etween 1929 and 1933, 10,763 of the 24,970 commercial banks in the United 
States failed” and this contributed to “plummeting production,” soaring unemployment, and a 
decline in real GNP of 30.5%); see also THEODORE ROSENOF, ECONOMICS IN THE LONG RUN: 
NEW DEAL THEORISTS AND THEIR LEGACIES, 1933–1993, 5 (1997) (ebook) (explaining that the 
Great Depression undermined assumptions of efficient markets without government intervention 
and “led to the New Deal’s enhanced role for government”). 
5.  E.g., MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 241 
(2016); Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2010, at 261, 284 (quoting GRP. OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL 
REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 29 (2009), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/2010b_bpea_gorton.pdf [https://perma.cc/7988-FUJ4]); see also ALAN 
S. BLINDER & MARK ZANDI, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
LESSONS FOR THE NEXT ONE 1 (2015) (calculating that without government intervention, twice as 
many Americans would have lost their jobs as a result of the Crisis and gross domestic product 
would have declined by 14% rather than 4%). 
6.  E.g., IRVING FISHER, 100% MONEY 8–9, 12–13 (City Printing 3d ed. 1945) (proposing the 
conversion of banks into cash-only entities to stabilize the global economy); MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY 65–76 (Fordham Univ. Press 1959); Adam J. Levitin, 
Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 403–07 (2016); see also Martin 
Wolf, Banking Remains Far Too Undercapitalised for Comfort, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/9dd43a1a-9d49-11e7-8cd4-
932067fbf946?desktop=true&conceptId=0f07d468-fc37-3c44-bf19-
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motivated by the inherent fragility of institutions funded with short-term 
debt and the government’s inability to commit not to intervene when that 
fragility becomes manifest. Nonetheless, because these proposals would 
entail sweeping changes in the structure of the financial system and would 
work only if they bucked history and successfully constrained financial 
dynamism, they have been rejected time and again as too costly and 
infeasible.7 
This Article proposes a more modest, and thus more viable, step 
forward: authorizing an “Emergency Guarantee Authority” (EGA). An 
EGA is a crisis-management system that complements the existing financial 
regulatory regime. The proposed EGA would empower the Treasury 
Secretary to provide emergency guarantees in order to halt a financial panic 
long enough to give policymakers the time they need to devise a longer 
term solution. The Treasury Secretary would have significant discretion to 
determine what claims to guarantee and on what terms. This discretion is 
critical to enabling the Secretary to respond quickly and to strike at the 
 
a81f2aae9f36&segmentId=dd5c99e9-30be-ddd0-c634-ff3a0c2b738f#myft:notification:daily-
email:content:headline:html [https://perma.cc/HEL3-Z7JS] (noting that since the Crisis “[a] 
number of serious people have proposed radical reforms” in financial intermediation and 
describing some of the other proposals). 
7.  See Morgan Ricks, Safety First? The Deceptive Allure of Full Reserve Banking, 83 U. CHI. 
L. REV. ONLINE 113, 114, 118–19 (2017) (explaining why narrow banking proposals are not 
likely to work as hoped); see also Kathryn Judge, The Importance of “Money,” 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 1148, 1155–56 (2017) (reviewing MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016)) (explaining why Morgan Ricks’s innovative proposal to limit 
the issuance of short-term debt and have the government guarantee all such debt is unlikely to 
panic-proof the financial system). 
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heart of the problem even when a threat arises outside the regulated banking 
sector. This discretion would be constrained by procedural constraints, 
reporting requirements, a prohibition on repeat protection, and a strict time 
limit. The EGA and any guarantees extended pursuant to that authority 
would expire in two years from the time the EGA is first invoked.  
In contrast to many recent reforms and reform proposals, the EGA 
does not purport to prevent or solve the challenge of financial fragility. Its 
aim, instead, is resilience—reducing the macroeconomic costs of financial 
crises and preserving the accountability that so often is compromised when 
panic takes hold.  
The banking literature provides a number of explanations for why 
short-term creditors run, with some focused on coordination challenges and 
others on information dynamics.8  Guarantees are one of the only 
government interventions that can stop a run irrespective of the reasons for 
it.9  Experience further affirms the distinct value of guarantees.  Regulators 
in the United States and abroad regularly used guarantees during the Crisis, 
even when they had to stretch their legal authority to do so.10  Creating an 
 
8. See infra Part I.. 
9. See infra Part II (showing that each of the major U.S. financial regulators used guarantee-
like interventions during the Crisis); Franklin Allen et al., Moral Hazard and Government 
Guarantees in the Banking Industry, 1 J. FIN. REG. 30, 34, fig.1 (2015) (showing that nine 
countries provided unlimited deposit insurance during the crisis and virtually all others, including 
the United States, increased those limits significantly when the crisis hit). 
10. See infra Part II (showing that each of the major U.S. financial regulators used guarantee-
like interventions during the Crisis); Franklin Allen et al., Moral Hazard and Government 
Guarantees in the Banking Industry, 1 J. FIN. REG. 30, 34, fig.1 (2015) (showing that nine 
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EGA would provide financial regulators the tool they need to contain a 
growing financial crisis while also institutionalizing constraints to ensure 
that they remain motivated to address the underlying problems underlying a 
panic.  By enabling policymakers to act quickly to contain a systemic crisis 
while also deterring forbearance, the EGA can help mitigate the most 
significant mechanisms through which problems in the financial sector can 
harm the real economy.  
A second but no less important function of the proposed EGA is to 
preserve the democratic legitimacy that is so often compromised when a 
crisis strikes.  By expanding the capacity of the executive branch to act 
quickly to contain a crisis while also institutionalizing a role for Congress, 
the EGA sets up an infrastructure through which elected officials can 
preserve and promote values beyond economic health.  The political unrest 
and lack of trust in public and private institutions since the Crisis attest to 
the need to address fairness and other concerns alongside trying to protect 
the real economy from harm.11 
Examining crises through an informational lens illuminates how the 
EGA can help address so many of the challenges crises can pose. The key is 
to start with a realistic set of assumptions regarding what elected officials, 
 
countries provided unlimited deposit insurance during the crisis and virtually all others, including 
the United States, increased those limits significantly when the crisis hit). 
11 [Pew] 
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regulators, market participants, and others actually know when a crisis first 
hits.12 When bank depositors and other short-term creditors run, they are 
often running because they have good reason to question the safety of the 
claims they are holding.13 To achieve lasting stability, policymakers must 
understand, address, and convince market participants that they understand 
and have addressed the underlying weaknesses triggering the runs. As 
former Federal Reserve official Donald Kohn explains: “The key to turning 
the situation around [in the 2007-2009 financial crisis] was identifying all 
the problems and coming up with detailed and credible plans for dealing 
with them across their many dimensions.”14 Empirical work examining a 
broader set of crises supports Kohn’s assessment.15 Developing a 
comprehensive plan, however, and getting feedback from elected officials 
 
12.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xvi–xvii (2011) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7M2-VGQM] 
[hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT] (observing that “[t]echnology has transformed 
the efficiency, speed, and complexity of financial instruments and transactions”); VOLCKER 
ALLIANCE, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: BANKING IN THE SHADOWS 39–40 (2016) [hereinafter 
VOLCKER ALLIANCE REPORT], 
http://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/VolckerAlliance_UnfinishedBusine
ssBankingInTheShadows.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9CR-C5XS]; Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The 
Role of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 843, 843 (2016). 
13. Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and 
Bank Regulation, in NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 
109, 121 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1991). If the challenge triggering the panic truly is just a 
coordination game, the guarantee itself might enable order to be restored. 
14.  Donald Kohn, Senior Fellow, Brookings Inst., The European Crises—Banking 
Challenges (July 12, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-european-crises-
banking-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/7DLC-SW4G]. 
15.  Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises, 31 J. 
INT’L MONEY & FIN. 1220, 1221 (showing that “the provision of liquidity support responds more 
strongly to the announcement and implementation of comprehensive bank restructuring policies 
than to the announcement of blanket guarantees” and explaining that clear and credible policies 
negate the need for blanket guarantees). 
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and other constituencies takes time. The EGA buys that time. It allays the 
panic long enough for policymakers to gather and analyze pertinent 
information, weigh competing values, and devise a viable plan for 
addressing deficiencies and addressing the fairness and other issues that 
might be at stake. 
The EGA will not prevent the next panic. And, given the inevitable 
vagaries of any crisis and the messiness of politics, there can be no 
assurances of how the EGA will be used when the time comes.16 
Acknowledging institutional and informational realities, however, reveals 
the modesty of the proposal to be a virtue, not a bug. Rather than purporting 
to answer in advance all of the difficult questions a crisis presents, the EGA 
creates a framework that aligns accountability with authority, facilitates the 
information generation and the exercise of informed judgments, and enables 
different types of policymakers to play roles consistent with their distinct 
competencies. And the EGA makes crisis containment more likely and 
excessive forbearance less so, even if it cannot assure any particular 
outcome. This is significant improvement over the status quo. 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I lays the foundation.  It 
examines the origins, utility, and limits of having a central bank serve as a 
lender of last resort, the most well recognized crisis-fighting tool. It also 
 
16. See infra subpart V(A). 
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introduces the literature on why short-term creditors run and financial 
dynamism and explains how each helps explain the value of a guarantor of 
last resort. Part II addresses the use of emergency guarantees during the 
Crisis. Part III presents the proposal and considers how it compares to what 
happened during the Crisis. Part IV examines the virtues of the proposed 
EGA using different frameworks to highlight the different challenges it can 
help overcome. Part V addresses some drawbacks. 
I.  From Lender of Last Resort to Guarantor of Last Resort 
A.  Bagehot 
Walter Bagehot’s Lombard Street: A Description of the Money 
Market, originally published in 1873, continues to be “the bible” for how 
central banks should respond during periods of systemic distress.17 In 
Lombard Street, Bagehot describes the inherently cyclical and fragile nature 
of the British financial system of his time.18 As he explains: “The peculiar 
essence of our banking system is an unprecedented trust between man and 
man: and when that trust is much weakened by hidden causes, a small 
 
17.  TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 118 (2014); 
Peter Conti-Brown, Misreading Walter Bagehot: What Lombard Street Really Means for Central 
Banking, THE NEW RAMBLER (Dec. 14, 2015), https://newramblerreview.com/book-
reviews/economics/misreading-walter-bagehot-what-lombard-street-really-means-for-central-
banking [https://perma.cc/88FQ-W6GV] (reviewing WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A 
DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET (1873)); see also Vincent Bignon et al., Bagehot for 
Beginners: The Making of Lender-of-Last-Resort Operations in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 65 
ECON. HIST. REV. 580, 582 (2012); Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft 
Constraints, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 79–82 (2015). 
18. See generally, BAGEHOT, supra note 1, at 122–59. 
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accident may greatly hurt it, and a great accident for a moment may almost 
destroy it.”19 Thus, in the face of a panic, the central bank ought not stand 
idly by. Rather, it should use its unique position to counteract the panic and 
the dramatic loss of liquidity that arises when depositors and other short-
term claimants refuse to accept anything but cash or specie as money-like. 
They should follow the approach used by the Bank of England in 1825, 
when it loaned money by “every possible means and in modes [it] had 
never adopted before.”20 
Central bank intervention is critical, Bagehot explains, because 
“managing a panic” is not “mainly a ‘banking’ problem. It is primarily a 
mercantile one,” which can have serious and adverse effects on trade if not 
addressed appropriately.21 Bagehot also laid out a vision for how a central 
bank ought to help quell a panic, emphasizing the importance of having a 
central bank make clear in advance that it would serve as a lender of last 
resort during times of systemic distress.22 
Bernanke and other leading policymakers regularly invoked a set of 
principles collectively known as “Bagehot’s dictum” to explain and defend 
 
19. Id. at 158–59. 
20. Id. at 51. 
21. Id. at 52. 
22. Id. at 51; see also Conti-Brown, supra note 20 (suggesting that the “failure of the Bank of 
England . . . to acknowledge . . . that they were the lender of last resort . . . set Bagehot off” and 
the book is largely “an argument about why this acknowledgment is so important”). 
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their actions during the Crisis.23 The dictum has come to stand for the 
proposition that during times of systemic distress, a central bank should 
lend freely, against good collateral, to solvent banks, at a penalty rate.24 
Economic historians have pointed out that this precise formulation cannot 
be located in the original text and that differences between the financial 
system that motivated Bagehot’s work and finance today increase the 
wedge between Bagehot’s initial contribution and the ways in which his 
dictum gets invoked today.25 Few disagree, however, that Bagehot’s 
Lombard Street played a definitive role in cementing the notion that central 
banks ought to act as lenders of last resort to calm and help avert financial 
crises. 
 
23. BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: LECTURES BY 
BEN S. BERNANKE 7, 29, 74, 83, 97 (2013) (repeatedly invoking Bagehot’s dictum, including in 
defense of the decision not to bail out Lehman Brothers); NEIL IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS: THREE 
CENTRAL BANKERS AND A WORLD ON FIRE 10 (2013) (noting that Trichet (the head of the 
European Central Bank), Bernanke, and King (the head of the U.K.’s central bank) “often invoked 
Bagehot’s words as a model for their own crisis response almost 150 years” after he wrote them); 
John L. Walker, Emergency Tools to Contain a Financial Crisis, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 669, 
711 (2016) (“In explaining this governmental authority to intervene in times of financial crisis, 
commentators traditionally rely on the principles developed by Walter Bagehot in 1873.”). 
24. E.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Failure of the Clearinghouse: Dodd-Frank’s Fatal Flaw?, 10 
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 127, 154 (2015); Eric A. Posner, What Legal Authority Does the Fed Need 
During a Financial Crisis?, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1529, 1532–33 (2017); Walker, supra note 23, at 
714–16, 715 n.150; Robert F. Weber, Post-Crisis Reform of the Supervisory System and High 
Reliability Theory, 50 GA. L. REV. 249, 275–76 (2015); Brian F. Madigan, Dir., Div. of Monetary 
Affairs, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium: 
Bagehot’s Dictum in Practice: Formulating and Implementing Policies to Combat the Financial 
Crisis (Aug. 21, 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/madigan20090821a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2MLC-D3FN]. 
25.  E.g., Bignon et al., supra note 20, at 580–81, 603; Conti-Brown, supra note 20; see also 
Posner, supra note 27, at 1538–41 (explaining the evolution of Bagehot’s principles in light of the 
evolution of banking). 
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B.  The Reasons for Runs and the Limits of a Lender of Last Resort 
The literature on the reasons for bank runs sheds light on the utility 
and limits of a lender of last resort (LOLR) in fighting panics. There are 
two types of theories about the reasons that short-term creditors run.26 Some 
suggest that runs are largely a byproduct of coordination challenges.27 Most 
of a bank’s assets are long-term and relatively illiquid, while much of its 
funding takes the form of short-term liabilities like demand deposits. If a 
large proportion of short-term creditors demand their money back at the 
same time, a bank can be forced to sell assets at discounted “fire-sale” 
prices, reducing the aggregate value of those assets. As a result, short-term 
creditors who are late to demand their money back may get less than the 
full value of their claims, even if the bank was solvent prior to the run. This 
gives short-term creditors an incentive to be among the first to withdraw in 
a run, even if they believe their bank is otherwise healthy. That runs can be 
self-fulfilling prophecies was most famously modeled by Douglas Diamond 
and Philip Dybvig in 1983, well over a century after Bagehot’s insights 
regarding the value of having a LOLR and half a century after the United 
States implemented a deposit-insurance scheme that can be rationalized on 
the same basis.28 There are now numerous formal models demonstrating 
 
26. Franklin Allen et al., Financial Crises: Theory and Evidence, 1 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 97, 
99–100 (2009). 
27. E.g., Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 12, at 121. 
28. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247265 
GOLR 2.11.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/19  3:02 PM 
201x] Guarantor of Last Resort 115 
how coordination challenges among short-term creditors can explain bank 
runs and why it can be rational for short-term creditors to make withdrawals 
even from solvent institutions.29 
The second set of theories focuses on information. Most of these 
models focus on information asymmetries between bank managers and 
holders of the short-term debt a bank issues.30 The core idea is that bank 
depositors run when they have reason to suspect a bank may not be able to 
make good on all of its outstanding claims.  Some of these models highlight 
the capacity of short-term debt to discipline bank managers, inducing good 
behavior and helping to surmount commitment challenges.31 More recent 
work suggests that as the financial system has become more complicated 
and interconnected, uncertainty32 and information gaps33 may also be 
important sources of fragility. 
Although sometimes cast as competing explanations for bank runs, 
coordination and information-based theories can also be seen as 
 
91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 402 (1983). 
29. For an overview of this work, see HAL SCOTT, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: 
PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS (2016). 
30. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 26, at 99–100 (explaining that the literature generally 
falls into two camps, one which “maintains that panics are undesirable events caused by random 
deposit withdrawals unrelated to changes in the real economy” and a second that “describes 
banking crises as a natural outgrowth of the business cycle”). 
31. E.g., Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in 
Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 497, 509–10 (1991); Douglas 
W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: 
A Theory of Banking, 109 J. POL. ECON. 287, 289 (2001). 
32. Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Collective Risk Management in a Flight to 
Quality Episode, 63 J. FIN. 2195, 2197 (2008). 
33.  Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 18, at 443. 
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complements—with the various dynamics contributing to the magnitude of 
the run triggered by a particular shock. These theories also help to explain 
the inherent fragility of any institution that relies on short-term debt to fund 
longer term, less liquid assets, irrespective of whether that institution is a 
bank or merely bank-like. With the rise of market-based intermediation, 
often referred to as “shadow banking,” the institutions in question may look 
quite different than a traditional bank, and short-term creditors may exit by 
failing to roll over short-term debt when it matures rather than making a 
“withdrawal,” but the nature of the inherent fragility is quite similar to the 
threat long posed by a potential run on the bank.34 
Understanding the reasons that short-term creditors run illuminates the 
value of having a lender of last resort. If short-term creditors are running 
solely because they are worried that other creditors will run—as the 
coordination theory predicts—the presence of a lender of last resort can 
theoretically stop a run before it even starts.35 When a bank can readily 
obtain fresh liquidity by posting illiquid assets as collateral, and thus can 
avoid costly fire sales, short-term creditors have no reason to run on healthy 
institutions. A lender of last resort can thus play an important role in 
 
34. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. 
FIN. ECON. 425, 426, 445–46 (2012) (arguing that the 2008 financial crisis resembled nineteenth 
century banking panics with the demand for higher “repo haircuts” having a comparable economic 
effect as runs by bank depositors). 
35. SCOTT, supra note 29, at 137 (“The beauty of the power of a strong lender of last resort is 
the power would never have to be used because runs would be deterred by the knowledge that the 
Fed would do what it took.”). 
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enhancing stability. 
At the same time, understanding why short-term creditors run also 
reveals the limits on when a lender of last resort alone can forestall panic. A 
lender of last resort that adheres to Bagehot’s dictum will provide fresh 
liquidity only to healthy institutions and only when that institution can 
provide sufficient, acceptable collateral. The capacity of this type of facility 
to stop a run depends critically on both the financial health of the institution 
receiving the loan and what short-term creditors know about its health.36 As 
Charles Calomiris and Urooj Khan have explained: “Collateralized lending 
does not work . . . when bank illiquidity is a symptom of substantially 
increased default risk of the bank. In such circumstances, the use of 
collateralized lending can actually exacerbate the liquidity problems of a 
bank by effectively subordinating the bank’s depositors to the central bank 
or government lender . . . .”37 As a result, when a run is triggered by 
concerns about a bank’s health, “a collateralized loan . . . might even cause 
a depositor run rather than prevent one.”38 A lender of last resort is thus 
most effective when short-term creditors are running because of concerns 
about the behavior of other creditors, and far less so when they are running 
because of concerns about the health of the bank issuing their claim. 
 
36. See infra subpart IV(A). 
37. Charles W. Calomiris & Urooj Kahn, An Assessment of TARP Assistance to Financial 
Institutions, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 62 (2015). 
38. Id. 
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Another condition that must be satisfied for a lender of last resort 
alone to bring about calm is that short-term creditors must have credible 
information about the health of their bank and the mix of assets it holds. 
More concretely, in the face of a panic, a lender of last resort will deter 
short-term creditors from running only if those short-term creditors know 
that their institution is solvent and that it has enough collateral in forms that 
the central bank will accept to address the liquidity demands it is facing, 
taking into account the haircut the central bank will impose.39 Without such 
information, it can still be rational for short-term creditors to run, even from 
institutions subsequently revealed to be solvent. 
Adding historical and institutional context suggests that both 
conditions will rarely be satisfied. First, history suggests that runs and 
banking crises usually arise at times when depositors have legitimate 
reasons to be concerned about bank health, even if coordination challenges 
play a meaningful role in exacerbating a run.40 Second, short-term creditors 
often possess—and want to possess—minimal information about the actual 
value of the collateral underlying their claims.41 Short-term creditors choose 
 
39. A haircut refers to the discount resulting from the difference between the face value of the 
assets that a bank is posting as collateral and the amount of fresh liquidity that the central bank 
will provide against that collateral. Haircuts help protect a lender from the credit risk of collateral. 
40. History suggests that bank health is important in explaining runs, even if coordination 
challenges play a meaningful role exacerbating a run. Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 13, at 112, 
143–45. 
41. Bengt Holmstrom, Understanding the Role of Debt in the Financial System 12–13 (Bank 
for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 479, 2015), https://www.bis.org/publ/work479.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3D8A-9EPQ]. 
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to hold such claims because they desire a safe asset about which they need 
do little due diligence.42 The relatively information-insensitive nature of 
short-term debt is one of the reasons that holders are willing to pay a 
premium for these instruments, and this debt is often structured specifically 
to enable a short-term creditor to walk away rather than undertake 
meaningful diligence should questions arise.43 Guarantees operate to 
maintain the information-insensitive nature of this short-term debt, allowing 
holders to substitute the creditworthiness of the government for the need to 
have any information about the private assets underlying their claims. 
C.  How a Guarantor of Last Resort is Different 
Putting this together: When short-term creditors have incomplete 
information and questions about the value of their claims, a lender of last 
resort alone cannot stop a run. The capacity of a central bank to provide 
collateralized loans to mitigate system-wide liquidity crunches may be a 
useful complement to other tools when seeking to contain a financial crisis. 
 
42. Id.; see also Gary Gorton et al., The Safe-Asset Share, AM. ECON. REV., May 2012, at 101, 
101 (discussing the value of information-insensitive, or “safe,” debt as collateral). 
43. See Gary Gorton, The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 825, 
827 (2014) (stating that a financial claim operating as “money,” the primary function of short-term 
debt, requires “eliminating informative financial markets”); Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette 
Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt, 120 J. POL. ECON. 233, 235 (2012) 
(finding that Treasuries enjoyed a monetary premium that averaged seventy-three basis points 
between 1926 and 2008); Gary B. Gorton, The History and Economics of Safe Assets 1–2, 9, 20 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22210, 2016), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22210 [https://perma.cc/6ZVE-JX8M] (providing an overview of 
the literature showing there is a “convenience yield,” that is, the willingness of holders of money-
like claims to pay a premium for the money-like qualities); Holmstrom, supra note 41, at 3 
(“Opacity is a natural feature of money markets . . . .”). 
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The presence of a lender of last resort may also deter pure coordination-
based runs. But a lender of last resort that truly adheres to the modern 
formulation of Bagehot’s dictum, and thus is lending only to institutions 
that the central bank knows to be solvent and only against collateral it 
knows to be good, cannot stop a run when short-term creditors are running 
because of doubts about the health of banks or the value of the assets they 
hold. When one moves beyond the regulated banking sector to domains not 
subject to prior oversight, the likelihood that a central bank will have 
sufficient information to make accurate determinations regarding the health 
of institutions and the value of collateral declines further, further reducing 
the adequacy of a Bagehot-style lender of last resort.44 
A guarantor of last resort, by contrast, obviates the need for the holders 
of short-term debt to know anything about the health of the institution 
issuing a claim or the value of collateral backing it.  The reason for a run no 
longer matters.  A guarantee will work regardless of whether the run is the 
byproduct of coordination issues, information dynamics, or some 
combination thereof.45  
This is because a properly designed guarantee renders all of these 
 
44. As I explain in other work, the purpose of Bagehot’s dictum has evolved over time. No 
longer does it aim merely to address the moral hazard that arises from access to a lender of last 
resort. It is also used to justify continuing to house lender-of-last-resort authority in a central bank, 
even as central banks have become clear government actors, but ones largely immune from direct 
political accountability. 
 45. See infra subpart IV(A) (providing a more detailed account of the benefits of 
institutionalizing a guarantor of last resort). 
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issues effectively irrelevant.  Assuming market participants trust the 
government to make good on its guarantees (which can be a real limit), a 
government guarantee protects the claimant even if other claimants run, and 
even if short-term creditors have good reason to be worried about the health 
of the institution issuing their claims. Guarantees, whether provided through 
a standing deposit insurance scheme or through an emergency measure like 
the EGA, can render the claims “information insensitive.” It can restore that 
special characteristic that makes short-term claims so useful and pervasive, 
even if also a source of so much fragility.  Restoring this feature can be 
critical when the aim is to get private short-term creditors to stick around 
even when it is cheap to run and without such an assurance it would be the 
rational path for them to take.     
None of this rebuts that the Fed played a critical role in containing the 
Crisis. Systemic liquidity shortages were a major challenge throughout, and 
the Fed’s interventions helped to mitigate these effects.46 The efficacy of 
many of the Fed’s interventions, however, was dependent on the fact that it 
regularly deviated from Bagehot’s dictum in the policies it adopted. From 
its willingness to support institutions of questionable creditworthiness, like 
 
46. E.g., MARK J. FLEMING, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., FEDERAL RESERVE LIQUIDITY 
PROVISION DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007–2009, STAFF REPORT NO. 563, at 1–2, 20 
(2012), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr563.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SEY8-XBFM] (providing an overview of the Fed’s liquidity programs and the 
empirical work conducted on their efficacy, leading to the conclusion that “[t]he evidence 
uncovered to date . . . broadly supports the conclusion that the programs were effective at 
mitigating the strains in financial markets”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247265 
GOLR 2.11.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/19  3:02 PM 
122 Texas Law Review [Vol. XX:ppp 
AIG, to accepting as collateral assets of uncertain value, as it did with Bear 
Stearns, and to offering highly attractive interest rates throughout, the Fed 
was doing what it took while seemingly trying to adhere, at least at the 
margins, to the limits the law imposed on it.47 Looking closely at the ways 
the Fed used its authority, there were even times that its interventions more 
resembled guarantees than senior, collateralized lending.48 The core point 
here is that the notion that the Fed adhered to Bagehot’s dictum is largely a 
fiction, as is the notion that a central bank can stop a crisis while adhering 
to such constraints.49 A lender of last resort may be useful during periods of 
systemic distress, but it alone does not suffice to stop all systemic panics. 
Expanding the lens beyond stability provides further insight into the 
limits of relying too heavily on a central bank, acting without direct 
authorization from a more accountable body, during a crisis, and hence the 
relative benefits of the proposed EGA. The Bank of England of Bagehot’s 
time was a far more private institution than most central banks today.50 He 
was not particularly concerned about issues like legitimacy or democratic 
accountability. The situation has changed. Today, the Federal Reserve, the 
Bank of England, and most other central banks are government bodies, 
 
47. See id. at 9, 13, 19 (noting that the Fed provided financial support to AIG and “special 
financing” for Bear); see also supra section II(A)(2). 
48. See infra Part II. 
49. Calomiris & Kahn, supra note 44, at 62; Posner, supra note 24, at 1538–40. 
50. See SCOTT, supra note 29, at 109 (explaining that from its founding until long after 
Bagehot’s work, the Bank of England operated as a private corporation formed pursuant to a 
Royal Charter). 
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albeit exceptionally independent ones, and their ongoing viability depends 
on some degree of public trust. 
These “political” considerations are relevant here because crisis-
management interventions often produce winners and losers, even when 
designed to enhance the size of the overall pie. The perception that the 
Fed’s interventions looked out for Wall Street over Main Street has been an 
ongoing source of consternation for many, and a contributing factor in 
subsequent popular backlash. One of the early and most visible 
embodiments of this backlash was the Occupy Wall Street Movement, 
which eventually “ignited a national and global movement calling out the 
ruling class of elites by connecting the dots between corporate and political 
power.”51 This movement has had a profound effect on political outcomes 
on both sides of the Atlantic.52 Although numerous other factors further 
contributed to this uprising, it serves as a powerful reminder of the long-
term costs that can arise when concerns about democratic legitimacy are 
ignored in crisis management. 
 
51. Michael Levitin, The Triumph of Occupy Wall Street, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/the-triumph-of-occupy-wall-street/395408/ 
[https://perma.cc/WQ3Z-28D5]. 
52. See Noah Barkin, After Trump and Brexit, Populist Tsunami Threatens European 
Mainstream, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-populists-
analysis/after-trump-and-brexit-populist-tsunami-threatens-european-mainstream-
idUSKBN1341I1 [https://perma.cc/W3RP-KBV6]; Owen Matthews, Beyond Brexit: Europe’s 
Populist Backlash Against Immigration and Globalization, NEWSWEEK (June 28, 2016) 
http://www.newsweek.com/2016/07/08/britain-brexit-wounds-european-nationalism-475101.html 
[http://perma.cc/F6UC-ARVA]; Simon Shuster, The Populists, TIME, http://time.com/time-
person-of-the-year-populism/ [https://perma.cc/XC7E-L4KG] (discussing the 2016 U.S. election’s 
effect on the rise of populist decentralization and disintegration in Europe). 
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These political considerations, and the assumption that they shape the 
long-term costs of crisis-era interventions, help distinguish the EGA from 
recent proposals to expand the authority of the Federal Reserve to provide 
more expansive support during a crisis. A number of highly respected 
academics, such as Hal Scott and Eric Posner, have voiced concerns akin to 
those here.53 They recognize that a Bagehot-style lender of last resort 
cannot suffice to contain a panic and are troubled by the post-crisis reforms 
that pull back, rather than expand, the Fed’s authority to intervene to 
contain a growing crisis.54 In their analyses, however, this is reason to 
provide the Fed greater authority to provide guarantees and potentially even 
to take more drastic and obviously fiscal steps to stabilize fragile firms in 
the midst of a panic.55 The proposal here rejects such an approach. The two-
year time limit on guarantees issued pursuant to the EGA institutionalizes a 
mechanism whereby Congress must authorize any longer term support. 
Although the breadth of the guarantee is designed to obviate the need for 
regulators to comply with the fiction that they can and should draw hard 
lines between solvent and insolvent firms at the height of a crisis, the time-
 
53.  SCOTT, supra note 32, at 268–71; Posner, supra note 27, at 1567–68. 
54.  See SCOTT, supra note 32, at 79–80, 93–94 (juxtaposing the need for a presence of a 
strong lender of last resort to ensure financial stability and the dangers of the restrictions placed on 
the Fed’s lending powers by the Dodd-Frank Act); Posner, supra note 27, at 1571 (“The recent 
financial crisis shows why [additional] powers are necessary and the conventional Bagehot 
approach is inadequate.”). 
55.  See SCOTT, supra note 32, at 93, 137–44 (discussing possible reforms to strengthen the 
Fed’s role to provide greater stability); Posner, supra note 27, at 1568–69, 1575 (identifying limits 
placed on the Fed and arguing Congress should have “gathered as many of those [lender-of-last-
resort] powers as possible into the hands of the Fed”). 
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limits nature of the guarantees precludes them from being used as a tool to 
recapitalize firms or provide other long-term fiscal support. The design 
gives regulators the time and incentives to determine where fiscal support 
may be warranted and then requires them to report these findings and 
recommendations to Congress. It thus introduces a procedure for allocating 
explicitly fiscal decisions to Congress while providing a pragmatic 
approach to stabilizing the system in the short run so Congress can have the 
time and information required to make those decisions. Put differently, the 
EGA builds a procedure for answering the hard questions a crisis will pose 
rather than purporting to answer them all in advance. 
D.  Ongoing Relevance: Action and Creativity 
In dismissing the notion that a lender of last resort acting within the 
constraints attributed to Bagehot can suffice to contain a crisis, the analysis 
here does not rebut the deeper insights motivating his claims.56 Among his 
key insights were his recognition of the potential for panics to inflict 
widespread costs, his acknowledgment that intervention was warranted to 
avert these costs, and the value of flexibility and creativity in crafting those 
interventions.57 These lessons also lay a foundation for understanding the 
 
56. An alternative, and not inconsistent, explanation is that central bankers frequently invoked 
Bagehot during the Crisis because they knew they were stretching the bounds of lawful and 
acceptable behavior, and his dictum was the most readily amenable principled norm to explain and 
defend their actions. See Judge, supra note 17, at 80–82. 
57. BAGEHOT, supra note 1, at 51–54. 
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value of having a guarantor of last resort alongside a lender of last resort. 
Recognizing that allowing the market forces to run unabated when 
panic sets in can have deleterious effects far in excess of the losses on 
withdrawing creditors and the banks issuing their claims is integral to 
understanding Bagehot’s claim that central banks should intervene. 
Subsequent experience and empirical work affirm that when a systemic 
crisis hits, there are systemic repercussions.58 Because of interconnections, 
common exposures, and signaling, the failure of one bank can trigger runs 
on other, even potentially sound, institutions.59 The failure of banks and 
bank-like institutions, in turn, can lead to a loss of information, liquidity 
hoarding, and a reduction in credit for the real economy, harming growth.60 
 
58. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND 
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 15, 18, 20 (2013) (providing a broad overview of 
the literature on the myriad costs of the Crisis, including: output losses in the “range from several 
trillion to over $10 trillion,” “the longest stretch of unemployment above 8 percent in the United 
States since the Great Depression,” and a decline in “median household net worth [of] $49,100 per 
family, or by nearly 39 percent, between 2007 and 2010”); David Luttrell et al., Assessing the 
Costs and Consequences of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath, FED. RESERVE BANK 
OF DALL. ECON. LETTER, Sept. 2013, at 1, 
https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/Documents/research/eclett/2013/el1307.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/A42L-PSTF] (estimating that “the cost of the crisis, assuming [optimistically 
that] output eventually returns to its precrisis trend path, is an output loss of $6 trillion to $14 
trillion,” which “amounts to $50,000 to $120,000 for every U.S. household”); Carmen M. 
Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, The Aftermath of Financial Crises 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 14656, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14656 
[https://perma.cc/3359-FACN] (finding that “financial crises are protracted affairs” that usually 
“share three characteristics”: (1) “deep and prolonged” “asset market collapses,” with “[r]eal 
housing price declines averag[ing] 35 percent stretched out over six years”; (2) “profound declines 
in output and employment,” including an “unemployment rate [that] rises an average of 7 
percentage points”; and (3) the “real value of government debt tends to explode, rising an average 
of 86 percent in the major post-World War II episodes”). 
59.  XAVIER FREIXAS & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, MICROECONOMICS OF BANKING 195–96 
(1997); Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1, 2 (2000); 
Xavier Freixas et al., Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central 
Bank, 32 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 611, 611–12 (2000). 
60.  See Freixas & Rochet, supra note 59, at 310 (explaining that because banks arise to solve 
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As explained by Neel Kashkari, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis: “Failures of large financial institutions pose massively 
asymmetric risks to society . . . . A very crude analogy is that of a nuclear 
reactor. The cost . . . of letting a reactor melt down is astronomical. Given 
that cost, governments will do whatever they can to stabilize the reactor 
before they lose control.”61 It is this same asymmetry that makes it virtually 
impossible, and unwise, for the government not to intervene in the face of a 
financial panic. 
The importance of creativity in fashioning a response capable of 
containing a crisis also remains pertinent. Time and again, particularly in 
the United States, bank-like activity migrates outside of the regulated 
banking sector. Although much of the formal work on the mechanisms of 
contagion focus on banking, bank-like structures are exposed to similar 
risks, and it is often in these domains where crises first arise. As Kashkari 
recognizes: “[W]e won’t see the next crisis coming, and it won’t look like 
what we might be expecting.”62 As further explained by Federal Reserve 
 
information asymmetries and other market imperfections, those imperfections re-emerge as 
frictions that impede activity when banks fail); Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Credit Supply 
Disruptions: From Credit Crunches to Financial Crisis, 8 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 81, 82 (2016) 
(identifying “a variety of empirical and theoretical papers” showing how the “loss of bank capital 
could cause capital-constrained banks to shrink lending and . . . this loss of credit availability 
could have deleterious effects on the real economy”). 
61.  Neel Kashkari, Pres., Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Remarks at the Brookings 
Institution: Lessons from the Crisis: Ending Too Big to Fail 4 (Feb. 16, 2016), 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/news_events/pres/kashkari-ending-tbtf-02-16-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/99BL-A3A8]. 
62. Id. at 3. 
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Chair Janet Yellen: “We simply have to expect that when we draw 
regulatory boundaries, and supervise intensely within them, that there is the 
prospect that activities will move outside those boundaries and we won’t be 
able to detect them, and if we can, we won’t have adequate regulatory 
tools.”63 Ex ante regulation simply cannot keep pace with financial 
innovation.64 
U.S. history supports these assessments. Based on his examination of 
the twelve most significant financial crises in U.S. history, Hugh Rockoff 
concluded that eleven of the twelve arose in some form of shadow banking 
system.65 In a similar spirit, Gary Gorton explains: “The cause of financial 
crises is the vulnerability of . . . forms of money that are usually the short-
term liabilities of financial intermediaries,” such as “private bank notes . . . , 
demand deposits . . . [,] commercial paper, [and] sale and repurchase 
agreements . . . . These forms of money exist for a reason, to conduct 
transactions, but they are vulnerable to sudden revocation, withdrawal, or 
 
63. Pedro Nicolaci da Costa & Ben Leubsdorf, Fed’s Yellen Says Regulating Shadow Banks a 
‘Huge Challenge’, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2014, 1:03 PM) 
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/07/02/feds-yellen-says-regulating-shadow-banks-a-huge-
challenge/ [https://perma.cc/73L9-YT5P]; see also Kashkari, supra note 61, at 3 (stating that “we 
won’t see the next crisis coming, and it won’t look like what we might be expecting”). 
64. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the 
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 75, 96 (2013). 
65.  Hugh Rockoff, It is Always the Shadow Banks: The Failures that Ignited America’s 
Financial Panics 12, 38–40 tbl.2 (Oct. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://indiana.edu/~caepr/Conferences/Wicker/Panics%20%2010-17-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NE98-Q7U6]. 
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exit.”66 Moreover, as he explains, there is a pattern to where and how these 
private forms of money arise.67 During periods of growth, the short-term 
instruments issued by the private sector, including those issued by non-
banks, appear remarkably safe.68 And when truly safe assets are in relatively 
short supply and costly to hold, market participants start to treat these 
privately issued forms of money as substitutes.69 Empirical evidence 
supports this analysis.70 Market participants recognize that privately issued 
short-term debt is not a perfect substitute for fiat money (or gold), but 
during periods of growth, when the demand for money-like assets for 
transaction and liquidity-storing purposes outstrips the supply of truly safe 
assets, private instruments regularly are priced in a way that suggests they 
are providing the same type of nonpecuniary benefits provided by 
government instruments and insured bank deposits. And, as just discussed, 
this is not irrational from the perspective of the holders of that short-term 
debt.  It is the system that suffers far more than short-term creditors 
 
66. GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM 
COMING 5 (2012). 
67. Id. at 8–9. 
68. Id. at 6, 8–9, 46. 
69. Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 43, at 253–54. 
70.  See Mark Carlson et al., The Demand for Short-Term, Safe Assets and Financial 
Stability: Some Evidence and Implications for Central Bank Policies, INT’L J. CENT. BANKING, 
Dec. 2016, at 307, 309 (analyzing public and private short-term debt as substitutes); Arvind 
Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Short-Term Debt and the Financial Crisis: What 
We Can Learn from U.S. Treasury Supply, 2–3 (Mar. 29, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b5ed/7f384a3ee2205dc5fce2fc7fb028b0ad4823.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T6L2-2DBD] (showing that the aggregate amount of short-term debt issued by 
the financial sector is inversely related to the aggregate amount of government debt outstanding). 
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themselves when debt holders exit en masse.71 
The widespread costs of uncontrolled panics and the dynamism of 
financial markets are the foundation from which this Article builds. The 
large externalities that arise from panics explain why market discipline 
alone will not prevent panics and why the government cannot credibly 
commit not to intervene in the event of a panic. Once government 
intervention becomes inevitable, the question is one of form and timing. 
With respect to banks, the classic source of fragility, the United States and 
other industrialized nations have chosen to insure claims of a certain type 
up to a specified limit, irrespective of whether a bank’s failure poses any 
stability risk.72 This broad insurance scheme is coupled with extensive ex 
ante government regulation and oversight to minimize the moral hazard and 
externalities.73 Ex ante regulation and supervision are only possible, 
however, when one can identify in advance the institutions that could pose a 
threat to the stability of the broader system. 
When the site of fragility is outside the regulated banking sector, the 
challenge shifts. Today’s system of market-based intermediation, like the 
other shadow banking systems Rockoff, Gorton, and other economic 
historians have examined, can play an important role in promoting 
 
71. Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 13, at 159 tbl.4.16 (providing evidence that at least one 
failed bank was able to pay its depositors in full). 
72. MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 233–36, 238–41, 
255 (1st ed., 2016). 
73. Id. at 247–52. 
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economic growth and harnessing new technology to facilitate financial 
intermediation. Just as importantly, regardless of the social utility of 
financial intermediation outside the regulated banking sector, history 
suggests it is inevitable. In light of the significant new costs imposed on 
banks in the post-Crisis regime and the ongoing viability of using contract 
and property to enable intermediation outside that regime, there is no reason 
to think that shadow banking will disappear.74 If anything, it seems poised 
for further growth.75 Recognizing that financial regulators will necessarily 
remain behind the curve in identifying these sources of fragility, and that 
they will often lack the authority to subject new forms of intermediation to 
prudential regulation and oversight, makes Bagehot’s admonition for 
flexibility just as relevant today. It is also among the key virtues of 
institutionalizing a guarantor of last resort in the form suggested here.76 
E.  The EGA in Relation to Other Recent Proposals 
The final dimension of comparison that merits attention is how the 
EGA would compare with, and might complement, other proposals for 
 
74. There have been some notable improvements post-Crisis, like the creation of the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, its ability to designate non-banks systemically significant, and 
fundamental changes in how money market mutual funds are regulated. These changes, however, 
remain modest relative to the size of the shadow banking system, and the increased regulation of 
banks increases the economic returns from shadow banking, setting the stage for further growth. 
75. See FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 2016, at 3 
(2017), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/global-shadow-banking-monitoring-report-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/94PB-HAH6] (stating that “shadow banking that may give rise to 
financial stability risks grew 3.2% to $34 trillion in 2015 for the 27 jurisdictions” examined for the 
report). 
76. See infra subpart IV(D). 
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trying to tackle the challenges here at issue. Despite widespread attacks on 
the Federal Reserve and other central banks for reasons outlined here and 
others, many experts recognize that some change with respect to crisis 
management and the role of the Fed in managing crises is warranted. There 
remains, however, significant disagreement regarding the nature of the 
problem, the range of viable alternatives, and thus how best to proceed. 
Paul Tucker, former Deputy Director of the Bank of England, for example, 
has argued that Bagehot can still work so long as central banks provide 
more clear advance guidance regarding to whom they will lend and on what 
terms.77 Hal Scott has similar ongoing faith in the capacity of a central bank 
with broad lender-of-last-resort authority to stave off crisis and wants the 
Federal Reserve’s power to be expanded accordingly, but he also 
recognizes the value of empowering regulators to go further, providing 
guarantees and other forms of support, without having to go to Congress.78 
By contrast, others have argued for reforms far more drastic than those 
proposed here, most of which leave a central bank with a more central role 
in crisis management than the EGA envisions. Former Director of the Bank 
of England, Mervyn King, has come up with an innovative proposal to 
replace a traditional lender of last resort with a pawnbroker of last resort, 
 
77. See generally PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN 
CENTRAL BANKING AND THE REGULATORY STATE 503–24 (2018) (arguing for more rigidly 
defined and communicated lending standards paired with better accountability for financing from 
central banks). 
78. SCOTT, supra note 29, at 137–45. 
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able to lend against assets that have been prepositioned at a central bank.79 
Professor Eric Posner has argued in favor of giving central banks even more 
expansive authority to inject capital and take other clearly fiscal action like 
recapitalizing banks.80 In a slightly different but related vein, a number of 
scholars, like Morgan Ricks and Adam Levitin, have proposed dramatic ex 
ante changes to the structure of finance with the aim of eliminating even the 
possibility of panics.81 
The arguments for adopting the EGA in lieu of, or potentially in 
conjunction with, one of these other proposals vary and are laid out in 
greater detail in connection with the proposal itself below.82  The three key 
advantages of the EGA relative to most alternatives on the table are its 
capacity to address financial dynamism, its ability to accommodate a more 
realistic set of information assumptions, and its capacity to help promote 
healthy democratic engagement.    
Underlying the EGA is an assumption that ex ante regulation is 
critical, but finance has a way of changing whether we want it to or not.  
Recognizing that the financial system will inevitably evolve, and will do so 
 
79. MERVYN KING, THE END OF ALCHEMY: MONEY, BANKING, AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 269–70 (2017). 
80. ERIC POSNER, LAST RESORT: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FUTURE OF BAILOUTS 
177–78 (2018); Posner, supra note 24, at 1570–71. 
81. See RICKS, supra note 5, at 12–21 (promoting massive changes like the elimination of 
physical currency, the conversion of banks to public–private partnerships, and a cap-and-trade 
system for monetary issues); see also Levitin, supra note 6, at 357 (proposing the “Pure Reserve” 
system where safe banks exist exclusively for safekeeping and payment services). 
82 See infra Parts III and IV. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247265 
GOLR 2.11.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/19  3:02 PM 
134 Texas Law Review [Vol. XX:ppp 
in ways that weaken the efficacy of rules meant to guard against panics, no 
matter how well-conceived, suggests that the EGA will remain useful even 
in the event that ex ante regulation becomes significantly more robust or 
policymakers adopt one of the other reform proposals on the table.83 
Similarly, the various forms of calls for a more robust lender of last resort 
are interesting and might have some benefits if adopted.  But their efficacy 
often hinges on the central bank having high-quality information about 
which institutions are healthy and what assets are worth, both issues that 
become difficult to discern during a periods of systemic distress.  
Finally, the Article here is concerned with both the macroeconomic 
ramifications of how one approaches crisis containment and the longer term 
legitimacy issues that arise. Approaches like those proposed by Scott, King 
and Posner, while potentially offering benefits over the status quo, could 
exacerbate the challenge of trying to protect central bank independence with 
respect to monetary policy and may well increase the probability of political 
backlash following a crisis.  
The proposed EGA does not purport to solve financial fragility, nor 
would it exclude any of the reforms just mentioned. It could in fact serve as 
a useful complement to many of them. It would, however, shift the 
implications of adoption, both in terms of minimizing the adverse costs of 
 
83.  See generally Judge, supra note 7, at 1173–75 (providing an alternative view of financial 
crises, fragility, and regulation that contrasts with Ricks’s view and proposal). 
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unintended developments and in ensuring that there remains a politically 
accountable body positioned to take the lead when things go badly. 
II.  The Practice: Guarantees in the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis 
When it comes to containing crises, theory often lags behind practice. 
The Bank of England experimented, but inconsistently; Bagehot pointed out 
what worked and what did not work in light of those experiences; these 
observations then laid the foundation for his policy recommendation. 
Another century passed before economists formally captured the dynamics 
that explain why Bagehot was right to endorse lender-of-last-resort 
interventions. Other popular forms of bank regulation, from deposit 
insurance to capital-adequacy requirements, were similarly borne out of 
experience more than theory. 
Embracing the importance of learning from experience, this Part 
explores the frequency with which guarantees are already used by 
policymakers to contain financial crises. The focus is the response of U.S. 
regulators to the Crisis through the passage of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008. Given the limited formal guarantee powers 
enjoyed by regulators, this Part examines the practical intent and effect of 
the interventions examined even when regulators had to stretch their formal 
authority to achieve a desired aim. 
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A.  Guarantees in the Crisis 
1. The FDIC.—Even outside of crisis periods, a primary role of the 
FDIC is to assure smaller depositors that they will get their money back 
even if their bank fails.84 This would remain unchanged under the proposal 
here. During the Crisis, however, the FDIC provided a range of guarantees 
that went well beyond its traditional role of insuring deposits up to the 
statutory cap (which was increased to $250,000 per account during the 
Crisis).85 For example, in October 2008, at the height of the Crisis, the 
FDIC adopted the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program.86 Because all 
of the entities eligible to participate were already regulated banks with 
FDIC insurance and the program was adopted pursuant to a “systemic risk” 
determination by the Treasury Secretary,87 the FDIC was able to 
automatically enroll all eligible banks in the Temporary Liquidity 
Guarantee Program, which was actually two initiatives bundled under a 
single heading, while providing eligible banks a subsequent opportunity to 
 
84.  See 2018–2022 Strategic Plan: Insurance Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/insurance.html [https://perma.cc/AZ6H-DBZT] 
(emphasizing that the FDIC “protects depositors at banks and savings associations of all sizes”). 
85.  Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Basic FDIC Insurance Coverage Permanently 
Increased to $250,000 Per Depositor (July 21, 2010) (on file with author). 
86. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/tlgp/index.html [https://perma.cc/949Y-PAPQ] 
[hereinafter TLGP]. 
87.  Lee Davison, The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk 
Exception, in CRISIS AND RESPONSE: AN FDIC HISTORY 2008–2013, at 33, 34 (2017), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/crisis/crisis-complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LRM-N96K]. 
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opt out of one or both dimensions of the Program.88 
The first component of the Program dramatically expanded the scope 
of the short-term claims protected by the FDIC. Pursuant to this aspect of 
the Program, the FDIC “guaranteed in full all domestic noninterest-bearing 
transaction deposits” and certain other short-term claims at participating 
banks.89 These additional guarantees covered more than $800 billion in 
deposits at the program’s height in 2009, and a subsequent variation on the 
program eventually covered more than $1.4 trillion in deposits.90 
The second element of the program guaranteed banks’ newly issued 
debt up to a prescribed amount set by reference to a bank’s outstanding debt 
scheduled to mature.91 The guarantee extended only until mid-2012, even if 
the debt itself had a longer maturity.92 At its peak, the FDIC guaranteed 
$345.8 billion in bank debt through this regime, as a wide range of banks 
utilized the program.93 
Fees were levied on all banks that remained in the deposit guarantee 
 
88.  Seth A. Hoelscher & Duane Stock, Was Bond Insurance a Gift from the FDIC? 1, 4–5 
(Feb. 19, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.ou.edu/dam/price/Finance/CFS/paper/pdf/StockHoelscherPaper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6GCU-JQXX]. For more detailed information, see generally 12 C.F.R. § 370 
(2009) (setting forth the criteria related to participation in the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee 
Program). 
89. TLGP, supra note 86 (emphasis added). 
90. Davison, supra note 85a, at 33; Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Chairman 
Bair Delivers Remarks to the Johns Hopkins Carey Business School: Discusses Imminent Board 
Action to Finalize Rules on Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (Nov. 20, 2008) (on file 
with author). 
91. 12 C.F.R. § 370.3(6) (2015). 
92. Id. § 370.3(d). 
93. TLGP, supra note 85. 
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program after the opportunity to opt-out and on the issuance of any new 
bonds backed by an FDIC guarantee. The fees collected enabled the FDIC 
to earn more than it lost in the aggregate.94 Nonetheless, both programs 
incurred losses.95 The deposit guarantee aspect of the regime resulted in net 
losses.96 And, even though these were offset by net gains from the 
guarantees on newly issued debt, subsequent empirical analysis suggests 
that the great majority of banks using these programs enjoyed net benefits 
as a result, suggesting this too operated, on the whole, as a subsidy to the 
participating banks.97 
These programs served complementary aims. Expanding deposit 
insurance encouraged depositors to keep their money in banks, helping to 
stabilize the banking system. A secondary effect may have been to reduce 
the movement of deposits away from community banks and toward banks 
perceived as too big to fail.98 The guarantees on the longer term debt were 
not aimed at preventing runs but rather at helping banks to new debt as 
older debt matured. A common element of both schemes is that they largely 
 
94. Id. (stating that “[o]verall, TLGP fees exceeded the losses from the program” and 
providing a breakdown of both). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Hoelscher & Stock, supra note 88, at 16–21. 
98. Evan Weinberger, State Banking Groups Push Congress for TAG Extension, LAW360 
(Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.law360.com/articles/374241/state-banking-groups-push-congress-
for-tag-extension [https://perma.cc/LV8X-88FM] (explaining that “[s]maller banks argue that the 
guarantees helped even the playing field when competing with their larger rivals,” and describing 
efforts by groups representing community bank interests to extend the program). 
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worked to keep private money in the system and to keep it where it was 
prior to the crisis. 
2. The Federal Reserve.—Unlike the FDIC, the Federal Reserve had 
no formal authority to insure short-term (or other) debt. Thus, to understand 
the ways the Federal Reserve used effective guarantees to help stem the 
panic, it is necessary to examine the aim and effect of its interventions, not 
just the formal terms of those interventions. 
One example of a Federal Reserve intervention that took the form of a 
guarantee was the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual 
Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), put into place in September 2008.99 The 
failure of Lehman Brothers caused one money market mutual fund to 
“break the buck,” a term used when a fund’s net asset value falls below 
$1.00 per share.100 Within a week, investors withdrew more than $170 
billion from money market funds, creating significant disruptions in short-
term funding markets.101 At the time, money market funds held roughly 
45% of the outstanding commercial paper.102 To help counter the lack of 
liquidity in the market for asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and to 
 
99. Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/abcpmmmf.htm [https://perma.cc/3TAK-B4PT]. 
100. Jonathan Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual Funds as 
Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits, 17 STAN. J. L., BUS. & FIN. 131, 132 (2011). 
101. Id. at 149. 
102. Burcu Duygan-Bump et al., How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency 
Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual 
Fund Liquidity Facility, 68 J. FIN. 715, 722 (2013). 
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make it easier for money market mutual funds to unload such paper in order 
to pay all of the money market fund holders who were demanding their 
money back, the Fed launched the AMLF.103 
The AMLF was adopted pursuant to the Federal Reserve’s authority 
under Section 13(3), which enables it to serve as a lender of last resort to 
non-bank institutions under exceptional circumstances.104 The structure of 
the AMLF deviated significantly from traditional lender-of-last-resort 
operations. Pursuant to the AMLF, the Federal Reserve loaned money to 
banks to buy ABCP from money market mutual funds.105 The loans were 
made without any recourse to the bank that received the loan, and there was 
no haircut, meaning that banks could borrow the full price they paid for the 
ABCP.106 The terms thus operated in a manner akin to a Federal Reserve 
guarantee of the full value of the ABCP posted even though the Federal 
Reserve has no authority under Section 13(3) to provide guarantees and 
thus could not formally guarantee the instruments. 
Within ten days of its launch, the guarantees extended under the 
 
103. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-696, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO 
STRENGTHEN POLICIES AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 154–57 
app.II, 154 fig.14 (2011). 
104. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3) (2012). As enacted by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 1101(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 2115 (2010), “any 
reference in any provision of Federal law to the third undesignated paragraph of section 13 of the 
Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 343) shall be deemed to be a reference to section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act.” 
105.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 101, at 156. 
106. Burcu Duygan-Bump et al., supra note 102, at 724. 
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AMLF exceeded $150 billion.107 Subsequent empirical analysis suggests 
that the program succeeded in reducing the liquidity strains in the ABCP 
market and the strains faced by money market mutual funds holding such 
assets.108 Subsequent analysis also suggests that the program made it easier 
for money market funds to continue to buy ABCP, reducing the additional 
strain imposed on the already strained credit markets.109 Like the loan to 
AIG, the program experienced no losses and yielded significant fees for the 
Federal Reserve.110 Use of the AMLF declined precipitously when it was 
superseded by another program pursuant to which the Federal Reserve 
directly purchased ABCP and other forms of commercial paper.111 The 
program was thus short-lived, but seemingly quite effective during its short 
life. 
The support that the Federal Reserve provided to AIG to enable the 
firm to avert filing for bankruptcy immediately after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers was another instance of the Fed using its lender-of-last-resort 
authority to effectively provide a guarantee. AIG was the second large 
financial institution that the Federal Reserve helped keep out of bankruptcy 
 
107. Id. at 723 fig.3. 
108. Id. at 717. 
109.  Burcu Duygan-Bump et al., supra note 100, at 722–23. 
110.  Id. at 723–24 (stating that “the Federal Reserve did not suffer any losses in its operation 
of the AMLF,” which expired in February 2010). 
111. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44185, FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY 
LENDING 6, 26 (2016). 
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despite lacking the liquid assets required to keep its doors open.112 The first 
was Bear Stearns. In March 2008, the Federal Reserve facilitated JP 
Morgan’s acquisition of Bear Stearns by effectively enabling the transfer of 
$30 billion in risky assets off of Bear’s balance sheet into a newly formed 
entity funded with just over $1 billion from JP Morgan and nearly $29 
billion from the New York Fed.113 Although the Federal Reserve ultimately 
profited from the transaction, it incurred significant credit risk in the interim 
and, because the Federal Reserve intervention enabled Bear to avoid 
bankruptcy, it has subsequently been viewed as a government bailout of the 
firm.114 
In contrast to the situation with Bear Stearns, the AIG intervention was 
structured to enable it to remain a stand-alone company. Pursuant to the 
initial agreement between the Federal Reserve and AIG, the Federal 
Reserve agreed to provide up to $85 billion in fresh liquidity to AIG in 
exchange for a 79.9% stake in the company along with other fees and 
 
112. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 101, at 32–33. 
113. MAIDEN LANE LLC, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE 
YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2014 AND 2013, AND INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 7 (2015), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/maidenlanellcfinstmt2015_508.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2TYB-YLTD]; Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., 
https:www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html [https://perma.cc/4XL4-S7AF]. 
114.  See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 112 (“June 14, 2012: Maiden Lane 
LLC . . . repaid the loans made by the New York Fed, with interest.”); Net Portfolio Holdings of 
Maiden Lane LLC, ALFRED, 
https://alfred.stlouisfed.org/series?seid=WMAIDEN1&utm_source=series_page&utm_medium=r
elated_content&utm_term=related_resources&utm_campaign=alfred [https://perma.cc/5J4H-
THMG, with the date range set to 2008-01-18 to the current date) (showing that the value of the 
assets in the LLC declined significantly before rebounding, with the aggregate portfolio value 
subsequently declining as a result of sales). 
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interest.115 Critical to the analysis here is that implicit in this $85 billion 
commitment was an understanding that the government would provide AIG 
whatever support was required to enable it to avert bankruptcy.116 The true 
guarantee-like scope of the government’s commitment soon became 
apparent. When the initial injection proved deficient to meet AIG’s ongoing 
liquidity needs, the Federal Reserve, and subsequently the Treasury 
Department, ultimately disbursed more than $184 billion to assist AIG—
well more than twice the original commitment.117 
Although ultimately profitable, the transaction put the government in 
the position of being AIG’s largest shareholder for a lengthy period of time 
and exposed the government to significant credit risk. It was not until 
August 2009, “after posting a more than $100 billion loss over the previous 
six quarters,” that AIG again became profitable.118 Subsequent analysis “of 
the performance of AIG’s underlying real estate securities indicate[] that 
AIG’s problems were not purely about liquidity,” and there were 
 
115. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 856 F.3d 953, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
116. It is possible that if the government had the authority to explicitly guarantee AIG’s 
counterparties and other creditors, AIG’s liquidity needs might have been far more modest. 
117. For a detailed description of the government support provided to AIG, see BAIRD 
WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42953, GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR AIG: SUMMARY AND 
COST 8 tbl.1, 9–17 app. A (2017). With respect to the support provided by the Treasury, see 
Calomiris & Khan, supra note 37, at 62 (explaining that “any TARP investment in a too-big-to-
fail bank had always been an implicit contingent common stock investment” in that “[i]t was 
unlikely that the government would use its preferred status in the states of the world where it 
would be financially useful to do so (in bankruptcy or receivership) because the government 
would convert to common stock in order to prevent bankruptcy or receivership”). 
118.  Financial Stability: TARP Tracker from November 2008 to September 2018, U.S. DEP’T 
OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/TARP-
Tracker.aspx [https://perma.cc/D9R8-A468] (under the “Timeline Events” column on the right, 
scroll down to “August 2009”). 
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meaningful write-downs in the assets used as collateral for the Fed’s loans 
to AIG.119 
More generally, although the AMLF, Bear, and AIG interventions 
were all adopted under § 13(3), which is meant to enable the Federal 
Reserve to serve as a lender of last resort to non-banks in “unusual and 
exigent circumstances,” the forms of those interventions are as unusual as 
the circumstances that prompted them.120 Not one of these interventions 
resembled a traditional lender-of-last-resort intervention. Rather, consistent 
with the analysis in Part I, they were effectively guarantees formally 
structured otherwise because of legal constraints. 
 
119. Robert McDonald & Anna Paulson, AIG in Hindsight, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2015, at 
81, 103. 
120. Parinitha Sastry, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., The Political Origins of Section 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act, ECON. POL’Y REV., Sept. 2018, at 1, 1–2, 3 tbl.1. 
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3. The Treasury.—The most striking example of the Treasury 
Department’s use of guarantees during the Crisis was the support it 
provided to money market mutual funds. In the same week that the Federal 
Reserve launched the AMLF, and motivated by similar concerns regarding 
the mounting withdrawals from prime money market mutual funds and the 
potential ripple effects of those withdrawals, the Treasury Department 
launched a temporary program to guarantee money market funds that opted 
to participate in the program.121 
The guarantees were provided using the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
established by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934.122 That Fund was designed to 
enable the treasury secretary to “deal in gold, foreign exchange, and other 
instruments of credit and securities” in order to influence the relative value 
of the U.S. dollar.123 The Fund had already moved “from obscurity to 
notoriety,” in the words of Anna Schwartz, when used by Treasury to make 
a $12 billion loan to Mexico in 1995.124 The program extended the 
 
121.  Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) 
Liquidity Facility (AMLF or “the Facility”), Fed. Reserve Discount Window/Payment System 
Risk (Feb. 5, 2010), https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/Home/GeneralPages/Asset-Backed-
Commercial-Paper-ABCP-Money-Market-Mutual-Fund-MMMF-Liquidity-Facility-AMLF-or-
the-Facility- [https://perma.cc/E9AF-KG8D] (noting the AMLF program began operations on 
September 22, 2008); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary 
Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008). 
122. Id. 
123. 31 U.S.C. § 5302 (2012); see also Gary Richardson et al., Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 
FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/gold_reserve_act 
[https://perma.cc/ZT6M-SZTX]. 
124. Anna J. Schwartz, From Obscurity to Notoriety: A Biography of the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund, 29 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 135, 135 (1997). 
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guarantees on an opt-in basis; it provided coverage up to the value of the 
fund on the day the program was launched—thus serving to maintain rather 
than change the status quo; and it required participating funds to pay a fee 
in exchange for coverage.125 The majority of mutual funds participated, 
leading to the payment of well over $800 million in fees to the Treasury 
Department.126 The government did not have to pay out on any of the 
guarantees, as not a single money market fund failed while the program was 
in place.127 
Even though the government came out ahead financially, the episode 
revealed that money market mutual funds pose systemic risk and might 
require government support. With some prompting from the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, this revelation motivated the SEC to overhaul 
how these funds are regulated.128 As then-SEC Chair Mary Jo White 
explained when the new rules were finalized, the “reforms fundamentally 
change the way that money market funds operate. They will reduce the risk 
of runs in money market funds and provide important new tools that will 
help further protect investors and the financial system.”129 Thus, when 
evaluating the significance of the Treasury’s intervention from the 
 
125. Macey, supra note 100, at 149–50. 
126. Id. at 150. 
127. Id. 
128. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Money Market Fund Reform 
Rules (July 23, 2014). 
129. Id. 
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perspective of the money market mutual fund industry, the “strong reform 
package” imposed on them after the Crisis was resolved was much more 
costly than the fees they incurred to participate in the Treasury’s guarantee 
program.130 
 4. A Brief Look Abroad.—Given the diversity of different financial and 
political systems, and the inherent challenges of scope, the focus here is on 
the United States.  But the claim is not specific to the U.S. system, and so it 
is worth taking a moment to expand the lens. Following the failure of 
Lehman Brothers, a number of countries, such as Australia, Denmark, 
Germany, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore, expanded their 
deposit insurance schemes to cover all retail deposits.131 An overlapping 
group of countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom, also guaranteed banks’ wholesale sources 
of short-term funding.132 Ultimately, many of these countries provided 
significant explicit fiscal support to their banking sectors, in the form of 
recapitalizations and broader guarantees.133 The point here is merely to 
highlight that within a short period of time after the shock induced by 
Lehman’s failure, a good number of countries introduced broad Crisis-era 
guarantees to help stabilize their financial systems. That this mode of crisis-
 
130. See id. (explaining that the new rules requiring use of a floating net asset value (NAV) 
prevents funds from using the “special pricing and valuation conventions that currently permit 
them to maintain a constant share price”). 
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intervention was used so broadly suggests that policymakers believed very 
broad guarantees to be helpful in ways that went beyond the already 
institutionalized mechanisms for lender-of-last-resort support. 
B.  Putting These Actions in Context 
The array of interventions described above are too diverse and the 
ramifications too contested to yield simple answers about how best to 
contain a growing financial crisis. Collectively, however, they still shed 
light on a number of key issues. 
First, regulators already use guarantees to contain panics and stem the 
spread of financial crises.134 Short-term creditors are the ones who can flee 
most easily, and many of the interventions targeted them accordingly. But 
interventions protecting longer term creditors were also used with some 
frequency.135 All of the interventions had the aim and effect of reducing the 
spread of the panic by keeping private capital in the system. By allowing 
creditors to temporarily rely on the government’s creditworthiness in lieu of 
 
131. Allen et al., supra note 11, at 33. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. See id. at 32–38 (describing the use of guarantees in various countries); Luc Laeven & 
Fabian Valencia, Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 4–5 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/10/146, 2010), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10146.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4UL-QE9C] 
(discussing “widespread use” of guarantees and providing examples from different countries). 
135. See Sebastian Schich, Expanded Guarantees for Banks: Benefits, Costs and Exit Issues, 
2009 OECD J: FIN. MKT. TRENDS, no. 2, at 55, 59 (describing government-intervention targeting 
of longer term funding in financial turmoil). 
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having to worry about the actual value of the assets underlying their claims, 
these interventions helped to stabilize and protect funding structures that 
had been in place prior to the Crisis. In general, guarantees were used to 
reduce, rather than bring about, changes in how assets were funded. 
Second, these guarantees were needed because traditional lender-of-
last-resort interventions proved helpful but far from sufficient in preventing 
the panic from spreading. Starting in August 2007, more than a year before 
the Crisis hit its zenith, the Federal Reserve launched a number of lender-
of-last-resort initiatives to try to stem its growth.136 Those interventions 
made it easier for commercial banks to borrow from the Federal Reserve 
while avoiding the stigma sometimes associated with discount window 
borrowing. Starting in March 2008, the Federal Reserve also extended 
lender-of-last-resort support to many non-banks in recognition of the 
growth and importance of market-based intermediation.137 These 
interventions reduced liquidity strains, but they did not bring about a 
meaningful and positive inflection point in the evolution of the Crisis until 
complemented by more robust interventions.138 
 
136. For a detailed account of the Fed’s actions during this time, see Judge, supra note 17, at 
855–58. For a summary of the research, which generally shows that these interventions had 
beneficial effects, see Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global 
Financial Crisis, J. ECON. PERSP. (Spring 2011), at 49, 60–61. 
137. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S SECTION 
13(3) LENDING FACILITIES TO SUPPORT OVERALL MARKET LIQUIDITY: FUNCTION, STATUS, AND 
RISK MANAGEMENT 17 (2010), https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/FRSLending-_Facilities-
Report-final-11-23-10_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/T3BA-PL9E]. 
138. Judge, supra note 17, at 919–20. 
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Third, as effective as these guarantees were at helping to stem the 
Crisis, they too were stopgap measures. It was not until the underlying 
information gaps and capital deficiencies that contributed to the panic were 
addressed that the liquidity strains fully dissipated and markets began to 
function without government support.139 The required recapitalizations were 
possible only because of explicit congressional authorization, granted at the 
height of the Crisis with strikingly little information.140 
Fourth, expanding the scope of the analysis, the need to go to Congress 
at the height of the Crisis exacerbated the Crisis and did little to enhance the 
democratic accountability issues posed by the extraordinary interventions 
required to stabilize the financial system. The Crisis had been underway for 
more than a year before policymakers sought this additional authority from 
Congress.141 Nonetheless, congressional leaders were largely unaware that a 
crisis of such magnitude had been brewing.142 Moreover, when regulators 
sought this new authority, the Treasury Department and other financial 
 
139.  See, e.g., BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT: A MEMOIR OF A CRISIS AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 567–75 (2015) (describing the role of transparency and higher liquid asset holding 
requirements had on American recovery); Judge, supra note 17, at 909–11 (noting the results of 
the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program disseminated information on bank health, which 
reduced uncertainty and promoted market activity); Mishkin, supra note 134, at 61–63 
(identifying the information provided by the stress tests as “[a] key element in the financial market 
recovery”). 
140.  See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3766 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2012)) (identifying the purposes and broad powers 
granted under the Act); Judge, supra note 17, at 907 (“With the adoption of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 . . . Congress provided financial regulators with significant 
additional tools . . . .”). 
141. Judge, supra note 11, at 912. 
142. See BERNANKE, supra note 139, at 284–85 (describing the meeting at which Bernanke 
and Paulson warned Congress of the magnitude of what was happening). 
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policymakers still lacked critical information about the source of the 
problems and how best to address them.143 One ramification was that the 
House of Representatives initially voted down a bill to provide the Treasury 
Secretary additional authority, significantly exacerbating the Crisis.144 
Another consequence was that the Treasury Department requested, and 
Congress provided, authority to pursue an asset purchase plan that was 
never actually implemented. Instead, Treasury creatively interpreted its 
authority to buy troubled assets as enabling it to provide fresh capital to 
AIG, all of the largest banks, smaller weak banks, auto companies, and 
others.145 Although the capital infusions proved effective, the stark contrast 
between the plan presented to Congress in seeking new authority and the 
plan ultimately implemented by Treasury and other regulators renders 
laughable the notion that Congress played a meaningful role in shaping the 
approach pursued. Although this is but one example of the “unorthodox 
lawmaking” that has become the new norm in congressional action,146 it 
 
143. Id.; John Cassidy, Anatomy of a Meltdown: Ben Bernanke and the Financial Crisis, NEW 
YORKER (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/12/01/anatomy-of-a-
meltdown [https://perma.cc/LM73-PRC7]. 
144. Mishkin, supra note 136, at 54–55; Liaquat Ahamed on Lehman Brothers’ Fall, 
NEWSWEEK (May 17, 2009), http://www.newsweek.com/liaquat-ahamed-lehman-brothers-fall-
80127 [https://perma.cc/DT66-2NND] (noting that the Dow Jones Industrial average fell by only 
2.5% in the two weeks following Lehman’s failure in contrast with a decline of nearly 25% in the 
two weeks following the House’s no vote as evidence that the vote played a greater role than 
Lehman’s failure in contributing to the fallout that followed). 
145. BAIRD WEBEL & EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34730, THE 
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT AND RECENT FINANCIAL TURMOIL: ISSUES AND 
ANALYSIS 9–11 (2009). 
146. Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1789, 1791–96 (2015) (providing an overview of the numerous ways that unorthodox 
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starkly illustrates how the need to act quickly in the face of an emergency 
can deprive Congress of the chance to play a meaningful role in 
determining the appropriate response to a crisis, such as the conditions that 
should attach to any capital injections or other government support.147 
Fifth, the lack of adequate tools to address the evolving Crisis 
contributed to regulators’ willingness to stretch the authority that they did 
have. The Treasury’s creative interpretation of the authority granted to it 
under EESA was consistent with the behavior of all of the leading financial 
regulators during the Crisis. Facing widespread panic, the Fed, the 
Treasury, and the FDIC each proved willing to stretch its authority to 
provide the guarantees here described. Congress noticed both this creativity 
and the public backlash these interventions engendered. When the Crisis 
subsided, Congress scaled back each of these sources of authority: The Fed, 
for example, is forbidden from using its Section 13(3) authority to help 
individual institutions, as it did with AIG and Bear, and it must overcome 
new hurdles, like receiving approval from the Treasury Secretary, before 
extending any loans under Section 13(3).148 The FDIC similarly faces new 
limits on its authority to provide guarantees during periods of systemic 
 
lawmaking has taken hold and the implications for where power lies in the lawmaking process). 
147. This about-face did trigger congressional backlash. Representative Gary Ackerman, a 
Democrat from New York, told Treasury Secretary Paulson at a hearing in November 2008: “You 
seem to be flying a seven-hundred-billion-dollar plane by the seat of your pants.” Cassidy, supra 
note 143. 
148. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1101(a)(6), 124 Stat. 1376, 2113–14 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)). 
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distress, including a requirement that two-thirds of the members of the 
governing bodies of the FDIC and Federal Reserve determine that “failure 
to take action would have serious adverse effects on financial stability or 
economic conditions in the United States” and certain other conditions are 
satisfied.149 These developments may in part reflect a lack of appreciation 
for the need for crisis-fighting tools, but the fact that these sources of 
authority were generally subjected to additional procedural burdens rather 
than eliminated entirely suggests that concerns about accountability and 
legitimacy were also at the forefront of the reasons for scaling back. 
III.  The Proposal: The EGA 
Having established why having a robust LOLR does not suffice to 
deter or stop panics, and that federal regulators have already adopted a de 
facto policy of using the tools they do have to provide guarantees to limit 
the spread of market dysfunction when a crisis hits, the Article now turns to 
the normative claim that this de facto practice should be formalized. This 
Part describes how the EGA would work and compares it, briefly, to the 
various guarantees deployed during the Crisis. Parts IV and V address the 
virtues of the proposed regime, the rationales for its precise contours, and 
the challenges that may arise if it is adopted. 
 
149. Id. § 1104(a)(2)(b)(ii), 124 Stat. 1376, 2120 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5611(a)(2)(b)(ii) (2012)); id. §§ 1104–1106, 124 Stat. at 2120–2126 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 5611–13 (2012)). 
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The Orderly Liquidation Authority, which authorizes the Treasury 
Secretary to instigate an FDIC-controlled resolution of a non-bank financial 
institution and to provide liquidity to facilitate that resolution, serves as a 
rough template, although there are meaningful differences between the two. 
Also worth noting is that the EGA could serve as an important complement 
to other crisis-management and resolution tools, like having a robust lender 
of last resort and the current Orderly Liquidation Authority, but it could 
also serve as a partial substitute for these crisis-fighting tools. Given the 
Fed’s already diminished authority to provide emergency liquidity, the 
scaling back of other crisis-management tools, and the proposals to further 
reduce regulators’ crisis-era toolkit, this partial substitutability may make 
adoption of the EGA particularly timely and important. 
A.  The EGA in a Nutshell 
(1) In order to invoke its authority under the EGA, the Treasury 
Secretary, in consultation with the President, must determine that the 
situation poses a threat to the stability of the U.S. financial system and that 
other conditions regarding the expected benefits of government intervention 
and the lack of readily available private alternatives are satisfied. 
(2) The Secretary can instigate consideration of whether the requisite 
conditions are satisfied on his own initiative. He can also be compelled to 
make such a determination upon receipt of a written recommendation 
approved by the majority of the leadership of any of the major financial 
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regulators (namely, the Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, SEC or CFTC). 
(3) The scope and structure of the EGA—including eligible entities 
and claims and the terms of the guarantees provided—will be determined 
by the Treasury Secretary, in consultation with other regulators as 
appropriate, in light of the circumstances confronted. The features that may 
be incorporated include:150 
 a. An opt-in regime that assesses a fee from the entity issuing the 
claims protected in exchange for such protection. 
 b. A mandatory program that provides direct and automatic 
protection for a specified class of claimants while imposing no formal 
requirements on the entities issuing the claims. 
 c. A negotiated regime in which entities have the option to 
participate in exchange for providing information, undertaking internal risk-
management changes or agreeing to other terms. 
 d. A limit on the aggregate coverage established by reference to the 
value of the claims outstanding at the time of intervention, or a comparable 
cap designed to ensure that the guarantees operate to maintain, rather than 
change, the status quo. 
 e. Limits with respect to the particular claims, enabling the 
guarantees to cover the full face amount of the debt protected or some lesser 
 
150. Many of these features are derived from the experience of using guarantees in the Crisis. 
See supra Part II. Others build on a theory regarding how best to limit moral hazard while still 
promoting financial resilience. See infra Part IV. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247265 
GOLR 2.11.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/19  3:02 PM 
156 Texas Law Review [Vol. XX:ppp 
portion thereof. 
 f. Additionally, the Treasury Department would have the option, 
but not obligation, to adopt guidelines in advance of any crisis, such as a 
guideline providing that it would not intervene to prevent the failure of a 
single institution, but it may provide widespread support in the wake of 
such a failure. 
(4) The Secretary has the option to work with other financial regulators 
in establishing the terms and operationalizing an intervention.  The 
Secretary may further use her position as head of the FSOC to facilitate the 
communication and coordination required to achieve desired aims. 
(5) The Secretary’s otherwise quite significant discretion is subject to 
two limitations: 
  a. Invocation of the EGA is subject to a two-year time limit. 
Guarantees may be shorter in duration, but they cannot be longer, and all 
guarantees will expire two years after the EGA is first invoked even if a 
particular guarantee is not issued until later in the crisis. 
 b. Once the EGA is invoked to protect a set of claimants, it cannot 
again be used to protect the same class of claimants unless Congress has 
expressly reauthorized the Secretary to provide such protection. 
(6) Reports to Congress. 
 a. Shortly after making a determination regarding whether to invoke 
the EGA, the Secretary must report to Congress regarding its 
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determinations and the reasons therefore. The Secretary must provide 
Congress regular updates regarding any guarantee program implemented. 
 b. Within one year of first invoking the EGA, the Secretary would 
provide a report to Congress on (a) the reasons why invoking the EGA had 
been necessary; (b) whether the circumstances giving rise to the invocation 
had been resolved; (c) whether further action is needed to address ongoing 
threats to the stability of the financial system and what course of action the 
Secretary would recommend to address those threats; and, (d) if no further 
action is required to bring about stability, what reforms have been 
implemented or ought to be implemented to prevent a recurrence of the 
circumstances leading to the invocation of the EGA. Any other financial 
regulator who had played a role in invoking or implementing the EGA 
would be asked to sign onto the Secretary’s report or explain how its 
assessment diverged from that contained in the report. One six-month 
extension could be invoked with good reason given for the delay. 
c. Congress can determine whether to hold oversight hearings, 
empower an Inspector General to review the actions taken, or take other 
steps to assess the appropriateness of the Secretary’s actions. Congress 
would separately take up, as needed, consideration of any legislation 
required to address the lingering crisis or to facilitate reforms needed to 
address newly revealed sources of systemic risk. Alternatively, Congress 
could set up a special commission or put into place an alternative structure 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247265 
GOLR 2.11.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/19  3:02 PM 
158 Texas Law Review [Vol. XX:ppp 
for developing an appropriate response to the challenges revealed. 
B.  Comparing the EGA to Past Practice 
To understand the impact of adopting the EGA, it is useful to consider 
how the presence of this authority would impact the handling of an actual 
financial crisis. Although speculative, this subpart briefly considers 
(i) whether and to what extent the EGA would have enabled the types of 
interventions regulators used in response to the Crisis, including actions 
taken pursuant to legal authority that have since been scaled back; and 
(ii) other ways that having the EGA in place may have altered the nature 
and significance of these and other interventions. 
1. Scope of Coverage.—Many of the guarantees used during the Crisis 
could have been implemented pursuant to the EGA. For example, the 
guarantees extended to money market mutual funds and noninterest-bearing 
transaction deposits could have been adopted on substantially the same 
terms, subject to the explicit two-year time limit and other checks. 
Something akin to the Federal Reserve’s AMLF also would have been 
possible. 
The EGA could also be used to guarantee longer term or newly issued 
debt, as the FDIC did during the Crisis. Although the EGA is designed 
primarily to stop runs by short-term creditors, the range of creditors it may 
protect is not proscribed. Just as the FDIC recognized, enabling an 
institution to retain longer term debt can also help calm a panic by 
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protecting an institution’s overall funding structure. The need for the 
Treasury Secretary to authorize the terms of such loans, the reporting 
requirements, and the strict two-year time limit for the guarantees would 
preclude an exact replica of the FDIC’s program under the EGA, reflecting 
the additional checks the EGA seeks to impose.151 But the EGA could use 
the FDIC program as a model for how to use guarantees to help institutions 
attract new capital when longer term debt matures. 
The decisions made with respect to save individual firms, such as Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, brings to the fore the differences 
between a world with the EGA and that which existed during the Crisis. On 
the one hand, there would be no question regarding the authority of the 
Treasury Secretary to help avert the failure of an institution. Given that the 
leading regulators all cited lack of legal authority as the reason for not 
intervening to protect Lehman and that regulators grappled with their legal 
authority at other points, this clarity would have been a meaningful shift.152 
On the other hand, the need for the Treasury Secretary to take the lead 
 
151. See infra section IV(C)(1). 
152. See BERNANKE, supra note 137, at 302–04 (discussing the need for a plan to be 
politically feasible, and a plan that “looked like a government takeover of banks” would be 
rejected by House Republicans fearing an expansion of authority); HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON 
THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 225 
(2010) (admitting the Federal Reserve did not have the statutory power to save Lehman Brothers, 
but that such an admission would have devastated the economy); Public Policy Issues Raised by 
the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 
111th Cong. 15–17 (2010) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys.) (stating that no agency had the legal authority to provide the capital or 
unsecured guarantee that may have prevented Lehman’s failure). 
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authorizing such interventions, along with the other differences, may result 
in very different terms. Additionally, the triggering of the two-year time 
limit for any guarantees and the need to provide a comprehensive report 
regarding that decision would likely result in very different types of 
behavior following a decision to intervene. 
Although it is impossible to know how the last crisis would have 
played out in the presence of the EGA, a little speculation can bring to life 
the nature of how the EGA stacks up against the pre-Crisis regime. First, in 
March 2008, the Secretary would have faced a difficult decision with 
respect to whether to save Bear. Knowing that he had broad authority to 
provide market-wide support should things turn out badly may have 
increased the Treasury Secretary’s willingness to take the risk of allowing 
Bear to fail. Given that the overall financial system was stronger in March 
2008 than it was in September 2008 when Lehman failed, and the capacity 
of the Secretary to step in to combat uncertainty, this may have resulted in a 
very different and smaller crisis.153 Alternatively, had he decided to save 
Bear, that decision would have triggered the clock, setting a deadline for 
further guarantees and imposing a range of reporting requirements. 
Although it is very difficult to know, these constraints may have enhanced 
the preparedness of regulators (and perhaps even Congress and market 
 
153. For a discussion of the additional actions that could have been taken during this period to 
reduce the magnitude of the crisis that followed, see generally Judge, supra note 11. 
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participants) for the eventual demise of Lehman Brothers. And should 
Lehman’s demise still have materialized, the Treasury Secretary again 
would have had additional options, and the additional accountability, the 
EGA allows and imposes. The Secretary could have used the EGA to help 
Lehman avert bankruptcy, but he also could have used it to reduce the 
systemic disruptions of that bankruptcy by using guarantees to deter 
counterparties and other short-term creditors from running on Lehman and 
its subsidiaries.154 
2. Decision-making and Accountability.—Shifting the focus beyond the 
form of intervention to the dynamics surrounding adoption and 
implementation brings into relief what would, and would not, have been 
different had the EGA been in place. As an initial matter, despite the 
apparent diversity of actors involved in extending guarantees during the 
Crisis, making the Secretary alone responsible for invoking the EGA seems 
like a major shift. 
The degree of the change this would bring about may, however, be 
more modest than it first appears. The Treasury Secretary was deeply 
 
154. The importance of the EGA as a complement to changes in the bankruptcy code is 
reflected in the critical role of the liquidity provided by short-term claimants in enabling the 
process to proceed smoothly. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard 
Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 
EMORY L.J. 713, 740 (2009) (showing that the Fed and J.P. Morgan’s commitment to purchase 
$30 billion of illiquid Bear Stearns securities stabilized its share price); Mark J. Roe & David 
Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 728–29 (2010) (discussing the 
role of the government’s infusion of cash to facilitate the Chrysler chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceeding). Adoption of the EGA, however, is far from a complete substitute for the Orderly 
Liquidation Authority, which has a number of additional features that enhance its capacity to 
facilitate a more orderly and accountable resolution process. 
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involved in most of the guarantee-related actions that occurred during the 
Crisis. For example, even under the law then in place, the FDIC could not 
have provided any of the exceptional guarantees that it did without the 
Treasury Secretary first making a systemic risk determination.155 Although 
the law did not give the Treasury similar authority with respect to the 
Federal Reserve’s formal authority to take action pursuant to Section 13(3), 
inside accounts make clear that the Federal Reserve would not have 
provided support to Bear or AIG had the Treasury Secretary not 
approved.156 Moreover, economically, it was the Treasury that bore much of 
the risk of the Fed’s unusual interventions. Because the Fed routinely remits 
any excess profits it earns to the Treasury, any diminution in its earnings 
reduces the size of the remit.157 
The backstop provided to Bear Stearns illustrates these dynamics. 
Subsequent disclosures make it clear that even though the Treasury 
Secretary publicly ascribed the decision to the Fed, Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson was involved throughout.158 Moreover, in a letter to New 
 
155.  12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2008); Deposit Insurance Regulations; Unlimited Coverage 
for Noninterest-bearing Transaction Accounts, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,342 (proposed Sept. 30, 
2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 330) (supplementary information). 
156. BERNANKE, supra note 139, at 216, 285. 
157.  Jane Ihrig et al., How Does the Fed Adjust Its Securities Holdings and Who Is Affected? 
14 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2017-099, 2017), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017099pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4Q6-
GZF3]. 
158. Cf. Greg Robb, Treasury Details Key Role in Bear Stearns Bailout, MARKETWATCH 
(Apr. 2, 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/correct-treasury-details-extensive-role-in-bear-
stearns-bailout [https://perma.cc/822H-QC8X] (explaining that “Treasury Secretary Henry 
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York Fed President Timothy Geithner, he expressly acknowledged that  
[o]n behalf of the Department of the Treasury, I support this 
action . . . and acknowledge that if any loss arises out of the special 
facility extended by the [Federal Reserve Bank of New York] to [J.P. 
Morgan Chase], the loss will be treated . . . as an expense that may 
reduce the net earnings transferred by the [New York Fed] to the 
Treasury general fund.159  
Thus, not only are guarantees widely used already in practice, but the 
proposal to require the Secretary to make the appropriate findings to invoke 
the EGA and to bear the associated credit risk may also be viewed as 
largely formalizing a regime that already exists in practice. That the EGA 
expressly contemplates other financial regulators will often play a central 
role in operationalizing guarantees further suggests that institutionalizing 
the EGA may do more to affirm than disrupt the system in place when the 
Crisis hit. 
But there remains a reasonable probability that formalization could be 
transformative along a number of fronts. As a starting point, the EGA 
 
Paulson and the White House, through its spokesmen, have taken to calling the Bear Stearns 
bailout a ‘Federal Reserve action’”), with Letter from Kevin I. Fromer, Assistant Sec. Legislative 
Affairs, Dep’t. Treasury, to Russ Sullivan, Staff Dir., Democratic Staff, Comm. on Fin. & Kolan 
Davis, Staff Dir., Republican Staff, Comm. on Fin. (Mar. 28, 2008), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Treasuryletter0308.pdf [https://perma.cc/C93A-
P4FU] (stating that “Treasury personnel, [including Secretary Paulson], worked closely with [the 
Federal Reserve] as it negotiated with JPMorgan and Bear Stearns”). 
159.  Letter from Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec., Dep’t Treasury, to Timothy F. Geithner, Pres., 
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. (Mar. 17, 2008). 
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provides clear lines of responsibility in conjunction with providing 
authority. There would no longer be—as was the case with Lehman 
Brothers—an option for regulators to hide behind a lack of legal authority 
when making a decision not to intervene. Moreover, having a single 
regulator (the Treasury Secretary) accountable for decisions to intervene 
and decisions not to intervene might result in meaningful changes in how 
these issues are handled within the executive branch. Thus, even when the 
EGA would restore aspects of the crisis-fighting toolkit that Congress took 
away post-Crisis, it would do so in a manner that enhances accountability 
and could alter use accordingly. 
The Treasury Secretary’s capacity to invoke the EGA is also likely to 
have a significant impact on the behavior of other financial regulators 
during periods of systemic distress. Financial regulators regularly stretched 
the bounds of their legal authority during the Crisis, and notable scholars 
and at least one court have taken the position that they violated the law on 
more than one occasion.160 They did so, at least in part, because no one had 
the tools needed to effectively bring an end to the successive runs that were 
spreading throughout the system, and the specter of the Great Depression 
loomed large as a reminder of what can happen when the government is too 
 
160.  Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 374, 378 (2012), vacated in part on 
different grounds, 856 F.3d 953 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Posner, supra note 27, at 1548–53; Philip 
Hamburger, The Raid on AIG’s Equity Was Illegal, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-raid-on-aigs-equity-was-illegal-1520552723 
[https://perma.cc/5LU5-79RG]; George Selgin, The Courage to Refuse, ALT-M BLOG (Oct. 31, 
2015), https://www.alt-m.org/2015/10/31/courage-to-refuse/ [https://perma.cc/U5AH-HS55]. 
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slow to intervene.161 In a regime with the EGA, other regulators may be far 
less inclined toward such creativity and could be more easily disciplined 
should they exercise it nonetheless. 
In addition to its power, the limits to what the EGA can accomplish are 
also critical to understanding what makes the EGA useful in seeking the 
middle ground along the many tensions at stake in the handling of a crisis. 
It allows the executive branch to intervene quickly and forcefully to bring a 
temporary reprieve, but it retains an important role for Congress. Treasury 
must report to Congress and, more importantly, Treasury must seek 
approval from Congress before taking more substantive fiscal action, as will 
likely be needed to bring about lasting stability. The EGA thus integrates 
concerns about political and public accountability into the crisis-
management regime and harnesses these forces to help address challenges 
like moral hazard, rather than pretending that there can be such a thing as a 
purely technocratic solution to the messy and difficult tradeoffs crises 
inevitably pose. 
This very brief analysis of the ways in which the EGA both enables 
and imposes checks on the processes and terms of government guarantees 
as a means for crisis management sets the stage for a more comprehensive 
examination of the benefits, and some drawbacks, of the proposal. The next 
 
161. Posner, supra note 24, at 1546. 
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two Parts address each in turn. 
IV.  Some Benefits 
A.  Stopping the Run While Starting the Clock 
The core aim of the EGA is to stop a panic while simultaneously 
starting the clock. The overarching need when a panic sets in—as they 
have, regularly, in diverse countries throughout time162—is to stop the 
panic. There are numerous theories about why short-term creditors run, 
some of which focus on coordination problems among those creditors and 
others which focus on what those creditors know about the health of the 
institutions issuing their claims.163 Only government-backed guarantees can 
stop a panic irrespective of which theory explains a particular run.164 This 
helps to explain why deposit-insurance schemes have been so successful in 
helping to prevent panics165 and why such schemes were generally 
expanded during the Crisis.166 And it helps to explain why guarantees were 
used so extensively and in so many different forms at the height of the 
 
162. GORTON, supra note 67, at tbl.10.5; CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, 
THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 112–16 (2009). 
163. See supra subpart I(B). 
164. Id. 
165. E.g., RICKS, supra note 5, at 215–19. 
166. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt et al., Introduction to the Updated Deposit Insurance Database, 
VOX, CEPR POLICY PORTAL (Aug. 4, 2014), http://voxeu.org/article/updated-deposit-insurance-
database [https://perma.cc/N4C4-QEDX] (finding a marked increase in the number of countries 
with explicit deposit insurance schemes—of the 189 countries studied, “112 (59%) had explicit 
deposit insurance by year-end 2013—a sharp increase from 84 countries (44%) in 2003. The great 
financial crisis of 2008 influenced this trend, with 5 countries adopting deposit insurance in that 
year alone”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247265 
GOLR 2.11.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/19  3:02 PM 
201x] Guarantor of Last Resort 167 
Crisis. The programs adopted varied dramatically, and thus had quite 
different benefits and costs. Each, however, illustrates how guarantees can 
be used to keep private capital in the system and reduce the magnitude of 
the ripples that spread when a shock causes short-term creditors to have 
questions about the value of the assets underlying their claims or the 
inclination of their fellow creditors to flee. The value of a tool that can 
credibly stop short-term creditors from running, irrespective of where in the 
system problems erupt, is hard to overstate. 
Nearly as important as providing a short-term reprieve from the 
devastation a widespread panic can wreak, however, is ensuring that the 
underlying problems giving rise to the panic are addressed. In addition to 
demonstrating that panics inevitably arise, history also suggests that 
regulators are often too slow to recognize and address the underlying 
challenges, opting instead to forebear and hope the problem goes away. One 
of the most vivid illustrations of this type of response is the way 
policymakers at all levels responded to the savings and loan debacle of the 
1980s. Even putting to the side the adverse effects on GNP and other 
indirect costs, the process of closing failed institutions ultimately cost 
approximately $153 billion, of which $124 billion was borne by 
taxpayers.167 Subsequent empirical work shows that regulators consistently 
 
167.  Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and 
Consequences, FDIC BANKING REV., Dec. 2000, at 26, 33. For a description of some of the other 
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delayed the closure of institutions even when they were insolvent, and that 
these delays significantly increased the costs of closing the institutions.168 
Subsequent work also highlights the massive secondary effects of the 
failure to close institutions in a timely fashion, including losses to GNP 
stemming from the misallocation of resources and increased funding costs 
for the government.169 Even more recent work exploits heterogeneity across 
states to show that greater levels of forbearance are correlated, initially, 
with more lending but eventually lead to greater declines in credit, real 
estate prices, and growth when forbearance is brought to an end.170 
The tendency toward forbearance, however, is much more widespread 
and consistently quite costly. Another famous example is Japan’s banking 
crisis in the 1990s and the country’s prolonged challenges achieving growth 
 
costs, see CONG. OF THE U.S. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE SAVINGS & 
LOAN CRISIS 29–40 (1992); James B. Thomson, The Cost of Buying Time: Lessons from the Thrift 
Debacle, ECON. COMMENT., FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, Jan. 1, 1993, at 1, 2–3. 
168.  E.g., Thomson, supra note 165, at 4 (providing a summary of the various empirical 
studies conducted on the direct and indirect costs of regulatory forbearance during the S&L 
debacle and concluding that “losses on [the thrifts] that have been forced to close their doors 
significantly eclipsed the cost of prompt closure in the early years of the decade”); Edward J. 
Kane & Min-Teh Yu, How Much Did Capital Forbearance Add to the Tab for the FSLIC Mess? 
16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4701, 1994), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4701.pdf [https://perma.cc/EVB4-6BHL] (showing that forbearance 
increased costs even if one also takes into account the potential benefits associated with the 
strategy). 
169. CONG. OF THE U.S. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 165, at 33 (examining the adverse 
effects on GNP); John B. Shoven et al., Real Interest Rates and the Savings and Loan Crisis: The 
Moral Hazard Premium, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1992, at 155, 159–67 (describing the way and 
demonstrating how competition from CDs issued by insolvent banks may have increased the yield 
demanded from Treasuries). 
170. SEAN HUNDTOFTE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., DOES GOING EASY ON DISTRESSED 
BANKS HELP ECONOMIC GROWTH?, STAFF REPORT NO. 823, at 1–2 (2017), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr823.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E6NP-UCAL] (finding that “forbearance is associated with larger contractions in 
real estate[] and cumulative average declines of more than 3% in real GDP”). 
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following that crisis.171 Recent work formally shows how deposit insurance 
and regulatory forbearance can lead to financial crises and retard growth, 
and maps the model onto Japan’s actions and challenges during this 
period.172 There is also new evidence regarding the practice and 
determinants of forbearance in Europe.173 Moreover, while the practice of 
forbearance did not make U.S. headlines during the Crisis as it did during 
the S&L debacle, it continues to be a real challenge. A recent study 
estimates that over a third of the costs that the FDIC incurred in closing 
failed banks between 2007 and 2014 could have been avoided had the FDIC 
closed the institutions in a more timely fashion.174 Qualitative analysis of 
the period similarly suggests that regulators were too slow to act on the 
signals the market was sending and that there is at least a possibility that the 
depths of the Crisis may have been averted by a more timely regulatory 
 
171. E.g., Akihiro Kanaya & David Woo, The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s: Sources 
and Lessons, ESSAYS INT’L ECON., June 2001, at 1, 1 (explaining that “most of [the] underlying 
causes” of Japan’s banking crisis, including “regulatory forbearance when the system is under 
stress[,] are typical of banking crises in general”). 
172.  Robert Dekle & Kenneth Kletzer, Deposit Insurance Regulatory Forbearance and 
Economic Growth: Implications for the Japanese Banking Crisis 10–15, 21–25 (Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/05/169, 2005), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Deposit-Insurance-Regulatory-
forbearance-and-Economic-Growth-Implications-for-the-Japanese-17825 [https://perma.cc/ZE25-
TBM4]. 
173.  Timotej Homar et al., What Drives Forbearance–Evidence from the ECB 
Comprehensive Assessment 2 (Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1860, 2016), 
https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/154293 [https://perma.cc/Z832-TFD2]. 
174. Rebel A. Cole & Lawrence J. White, When Time Is Not on Our Side: The Costs of 
Regulatory Forbearance in the Closure of Insolvent Banks, J. BANKING & FIN., July 2017, at 235, 
235–36. 
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response.175 
More importantly, forbearance is merely one manifestation of a 
broader dynamic. When a financial crisis erupts because of underlying 
problems somewhere in the system, the long-term impact of that crisis will 
depend on whether the underlying problems are addressed and treated in a 
timely fashion or whether policymakers instead treat only the symptoms, 
allowing the underlying problems to fester and grow. All too often, the 
latter course prevails, adding to the size and cost of the crisis that ensues.176 
The EGA is structured to minimize the capacity of policymakers to 
take such an approach. It is a crisis management device, not a mechanism 
for preventing or solving crises. The two-year time limit is sufficiently long 
to enable deployment to have the desired effect of calming a panic, but it is 
also not so long that it can serve as anything more than a stopgap measure. 
Because the clock starts the moment the EGA is invoked, policymakers and 
market participants are aware that they must move expeditiously to 
understand and address whatever problems might resurface when the 
guarantee ends.177 
 
175. Judge, supra note 11, at 913–15. 
176. E.g., Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, Will the U.S. and Europe Avoid a Lost Decade? 
Lessons from Japan’s Postcrisis Experience, 63 IMF ECON. REV. 110, 114–17 (2015) (suggesting 
that certain European countries may be on a path of lower growth because of a failure to address 
deficiencies in their banking sectors); Harry Huizinga & Luc Laeven, Bank Valuation and 
Accounting Discretion During a Financial Crisis, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 614, 632–33 (2012); Judge, 
supra note 20, at 65; Ricardo J. Caballero et al., Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in 
Japan 1972 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12129, 2006). 
177. For further discussion, see infra subparts IV(C), IV(D). 
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B.  Time 
The fine balance between granting regulators sufficient authority and 
discretion to effectively stop a panic while not giving them so much 
discretion that they can avoid confronting the challenges at hand can be 
framed as an effort to provide regulators (as well as market participants and 
other policymakers) one key ingredient: time. 
Returning to the three explanations for a panic shows the value of time 
in resolving a panic.178 If the challenge is coordination problems among 
short-term creditors arising from the fact that early exit is rewarded and late 
exit is penalized once a run takes hold, time itself may suffice to bring 
about a cure. If the challenge is information asymmetries between the 
management of institutions and the short-term creditors funding those 
institutions, time might allow healthy institutions, on their own or with a 
third party, to devise ways to credibly communicate that health to creditors. 
If the challenge is one of information gaps, time can enable market 
participants and policymakers to undertake the information gathering and 
analysis needed to fill the most critical gaps. And, in the likely event that all 
three reasons are contributing, time can help in each of these ways. 
Starting with realistic assumptions about expertise, information, and 
ignorance helps reveal just how important time can be and why panics 
 
178. See subpart I(B), supra. 
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induce challenges that are not readily captured in many standard economic 
models. For example, Marvin Goodfriend and Robert King have argued that 
there is no reason to expect the government to have better information than 
private market participants regarding the actual health of a liquidity-
constrained financial institution, and thus there is minimal justification for 
having a central bank engaged in financial regulation and liquidity support 
outside of open market operations.179 Nonetheless, during the Crisis, 
numerous institutions that subsequently revealed to be solvent faced 
significant challenges obtaining the short-term liquidity they needed to 
remain operational. Although over-determined, much of this tension can be 
attributed to information asymmetry and precautionary liquidity hoarding 
that was likely exacerbated by the absence of a sufficient standing regime 
for addressing the spreading market dysfunction.180 
An additional benefit of time is that it may help market participants 
and regulators see a situation more clearly by shifting the frame through 
 
179. Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and 
Central Banking, in RESTRUCTURING BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA 15 
(William S. Haraf & Rose Marie Kushmeider eds., 1988) (“[W]e know of no compelling rationale 
for public provision of line-of-credit services to individual banks through a central bank discount 
window” given that “today’s financial markets provide a highly efficient means of allocating 
credit privately. Since central bank loan commitments do not appear to be necessary, neither do 
the supporting regulation and supervision.”). 
180.  Liquidity hoarding may also have exacerbated the challenge. See Douglas Gale & Tanju 
Yorulmazer, Liquidity Hoarding, 8 THEORETICAL ECON. 291, 311–12 (2013) (noting “absence of 
inefficient liquidity hoarding” as a feature of constrained-efficient allocation); Viral V. Acharya & 
Ouarda Merrouche, Precautionary Hoarding of Liquidity and Interbank Markets: Evidence from 
the Sub-Prime Crisis 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16395, 2010), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16395 [https://perma.cc/2Y36-U62V] (presenting findings that 
suggest stress in British money markets was caused in part by “weaker banks engaging in liquidity 
hoarding as a precautionary response to their own credit risk”). 
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which they are looking at it. Although the term “panic” is often used in the 
context of financial regulation as rational withdrawals by short-term 
creditors, it is not by chance that these events have been labeled as panics—
a term with dictionary definitions that include “a sudden unreasoning terror 
often accompanied by mass flight.”181 There is a rich body of literature, in 
fields ranging from neuroscience to behavioral economics, showing the 
effect of speed and context on decision-making and the ways a sense of 
panic can reduce creativity and degrade decision quality.182 Removing a 
sense of panic may meaningfully improve the quality of decisions made by 
market participants and regulators alike. 
To be sure, the claim here is not that the EGA is the sole tool available 
to buy regulators precious time when a crisis strikes. Many ex ante 
regulations, like capital and liquidity requirements, can also serve this aim 
and likely will work in conjunction with the EGA to preserve some level of 
stability while policymakers devise a longer term solution. The advantages 
of also having the EGA are two-fold. First, the EGA can be deployed to 
bring about stability in sectors of the market that were not subject to 
sufficient ex ante regulation in light of the associated risks. Second, the 
 
181.  Panic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014). 
182. E.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 41 (2012); FRANK PARTNOY, 
WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 1–17 (2012) (describing recent work in neuroscience on 
decision-making); Junchol Park et al., Anxiety Evokes Hypofrontality and Disrupts Rule-Relevant 
Encoding by Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex Neurons, 36 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3322, 3322–23 
(2016) (employing a controlled study of rats to show the ways that a “sustained anxiety state” 
adversely effects the neural functioning involved in decision-making). 
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EGA is unique in also triggering an alarm clock of sorts, discouraging the 
tendency to delay that can allow other buffers to be burned through without 
the sense of urgency needed to address the difficult problems that may need 
attention to achieve a more lasting resolution. 
C.  Allocation of Authority 
The importance of time takes on added importance when expanding 
the focus to include concerns about legitimacy and democratic 
accountability. To grossly oversimplify, there is an inverse relationship 
between the governmental bodies with the institutional competence 
(including information, expertise, relationships, and the like) to respond 
quickly to contain a crisis and those that are democratically accountable. 
Thus, alongside allowing market participants and regulators time to gather 
and distribute information in ways that can help alleviate the panic, time is 
also critical to enabling the more democratically accountable, but relatively 
uninformed, policymakers to play a meaningful role in the allocation and 
other issues that will inevitably arise in paving a lasting path to stability. 
Providing time to get various policymakers up to speed is but one of the 
ways that the EGA can promote a more appropriate allocation of authority 
among the various bodies involved in efforts to contain a growing financial 
crisis. 
1. Executive v. Congress.—A threshold issue given the separation of 
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powers among the Executive (which includes the administrative agencies as 
well as the President), the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is which branch is 
best suited to take the lead when a crisis first strikes. To tackle this issue, 
we must start by understanding what the baseline is in the absence of 
adequate existing crisis-management tools. One possibility, on display 
during the Crisis, is that agencies within the executive branch creatively 
stretch authority meant for other aims.183 During the early stages of the 
Crisis, the Fed, Treasury, and FDIC each creatively deployed the powers 
granted to them to try to mitigate the adverse effects of the fallout from the 
subprime mortgage crisis.184 The other possibility is that Congress must 
intervene quickly, with little information, or risk making the crisis far 
worse.185 This also happened during the Crisis. Although early stage efforts 
by the Executive brought some relief, they were far from sufficient to 
address the problem at hand. This led to a request by Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson, supported by Fed Chair Ben Bernanke, for Congress to 
grant him extraordinary new powers and $700 billion to help save the 
financial system.186 Despite asking for authority to spend more than any 
 
183. E.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 
9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1628 (2009) (noting that 
“[m]ost of the actions taken by the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC, and 
related agencies fit within existing statutory authorities, but not all did” and that “[t]he most 
legally questionable event was the bailout of AIG”), see also supra subpart II(A). 
184. See supra subpart II(A). 
185. See supra subpart II(B). 
186. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET 
AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 465 (2009); 
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single government expenditure in history, Paulson’s proposed bill was only 
three pages long, reflecting the fact that it was a rushed job rather than a 
thought-out plan that could be subject to meaningful evaluation and 
debate.187 Congress balked. Despite the insertion of a range of measures 
designed to enhance accountability, the House voted the bill down, and the 
stock market plummeted nearly 800 points.188 
Congress eventually passed a bill providing the Treasury Secretary 
much of the authority that he wanted but with a range of ancillary 
provisions doled out to garner sufficient support.189 Even more troubling 
from a democratic accountability standpoint is that the Act was sold to 
Congress as a way to enable the Treasury Secretary to stabilize the financial 
system by buying “toxic” mortgage assets. But it soon became clear that 
buying mortgage-related assets was not going to be the best way to restore 
stability, and the Secretary instead used the broad discretion that the Act 
granted him to recapitalize an array of firms, including banks, AIG, and 
auto companies.190 
 
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 181, at 1624–25. 
187. SORKIN, supra note 186, at 466. 
188. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 183, at 1625. 
189. 12 U.S.C. § 5211 (2012). 
190. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 181, at 1626–27; see also BERNANKE, supra note 137, at 
301–04 (acknowledging that: (i) even though it was never discussed with Congress, a number of 
financial regulators believed that recapitalizing banks was more likely to work than buying up 
toxic assets and (ii) the Treasury Secretary intentionally ensured the language was sufficiently 
broad to allow either course of action); SORKIN, supra note 184, at 489 (recounting a conversation 
in which Stephen Schwarzman, head of Blackstone, explained to Paulson the problems with the 
plan that sought to buy toxic assets). 
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According to Posner and Vermeule, the vastness of the authority 
granted to the Treasury (and exercised by the Fed) raises constitutional 
questions under the nondelegation doctrine.191 They recognize “such a 
challenge is highly unlikely to succeed,”192 but the very fact that Congress 
is pushing against the constitutional bounds regarding the amount of 
authority it can vest in another governmental body highlights how the 
nature of having to pass legislation at the height of a crisis compelled a 
legislative grant that effectively gave the Executive the capacity to devise a 
plan after Congress had acted, thus denying them their normal role in 
reviewing, providing feedback on, and approving that plan. 
This is not just a story of the Crisis but of crises generally, and of the 
inherent mismatch between the demands crises pose and the institutional 
competence of Congress as a body. Political theorists have long observed 
that it is amazing, given their size and composition, that legislatures manage 
to get anything done even under the best of circumstances.193 Congressional 
lawmaking requires the approval of the majority of two chambers of 
Congress, one with 100 members, the other with 435.194 This usually entails 
 
191. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 183, at 1630–34. 
192. Id. at 1631. 
193. Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633, 639–41 (1995) 
(identifying William Blackstone, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Stuart Mills as among the 
many who have opined on the challenge of legislating in light of “the sheer numbers . . . of 
persons that law-making involves” (emphasis omitted)). 
194. The Legislative Branch, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/1600/legislative-branch [https://perma.cc/4G47-RRQL]. 
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a process in which distinct bills are introduced in each chamber; referred to 
the appropriate committees therein; subjected to scrutiny, debate, and 
amendment within that committee; subjected to scrutiny, debate, and 
amendment on the floor; passed within each chamber; revised further by a 
conference committee with members from both the House and Senate; sent 
back to each chamber for approval in the revised form; and only then 
presented to the President to sign into law.195 This is a time-intensive 
process in which the substance of the bill is expected to evolve, often quite 
significantly, even if the bill is one of the few eventually adopted into 
law.196 Also worth emphasizing is that despite meaningful debates—both 
descriptive and normative—about the nature of legislatures, theorists are 
united in viewing deliberation as core to the legislative process and the 
legitimacy of the legislation thus produced.197 
Emergencies, however, require prompt action.  Even modest delays 
can exacerbate the size of a crisis. Allowing Congress the time required for 
it to develop the required information and expertise, and to gather feedback 
 
195. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 29 (5th ed. 2014). 
196.  Legislative Productivity in Congress and Workload, THE BROOKINGS INST. 1, 3, 7, 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Vital-Statistics-Chapter-6-Legislative-
Productivity-in-Congress-and-Workload_UPDATE.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG7Q-48LB] in Vital 
Statistics on Congress: Data on the U.S. Congress, Updated May 2018, THE BROOKINGS INST. 
(May 21, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/ 
[https://perma.cc/2HCQ-KAVF] (statistically documenting the small proportion of bills 
introduced that actually become law in the post-War period). 
197. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 195, at 262 (“Both pluralist (agency) and republican 
(trusteeship) theorists emphasize the importance of legislative deliberation . . . .”). 
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from constituents, as they would need to in order to develop an appropriate 
legislative response, would only increase the magnitude of the recession 
everyone is seeking to minimize. Although emergency legislation may be 
but one form of a growing body of “unorthodox” lawmaking that is 
becoming the new norm, it is a form that significantly alters the balance of 
power between Congress and the Executive and undermines the role 
Congress is meant to play.198 
In short, the Executive must take the lead during a crisis. If it lacks 
sufficient power to address the crisis at hand, whether that crisis takes the 
form of a threat to financial stability or the need to respond to a terrorist 
attack, Congress may have little choice but to act quickly to provide the 
Executive new power subject to limited oversight to ensure the situation is 
addressed.199 In addition to raising fundamental constitutional questions 
 
198.  Although Posner and Vermeule may view this as an inevitable and even appropriate 
development even outside of crisis periods, others view this as far less benign. Cf. ERIC A. 
POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 
16–17 (2010) (concluding that a Madisonian regime with separation of powers is obsolete), with 
Harvey Mansfield, Is the Imperial Presidency Inevitable?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/books/review/book-review-the-executive-unbound-by-eric-
a-posner-and-adrian-vermeule.html [https://perma.cc/HA8N-8VCT] (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER 
& ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND) (arguing that the authors “should reconsider 
whether formal institutions like the separation of powers in the Constitution are as insignificant as 
they say”), and PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 1 (2014) (arguing 
that it is time to “reconsider the lawfulness of administrative law”). See also SCOTT, supra note 
32, at xviii–xxi (calling for Congress to grant “strong anti-contagion weapons” to fight financial 
crises but realizing the impossibility); Charles W. Calomiris, Government by ‘Guidance’ Quashes 
Economic Freedom and Rule of Law, FORBES (Jan. 5, 2015, 7:56 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlescalomiris/2015/01/05/government-by-guidance-quashes-
economic-freedom-and-rule-of-law [https://perma.cc/C2DY-2H5N] (characterizing agency 
informal rulemaking and guidance as “imperious bureaucracy” and calling for greater 
congressional oversight over agency-made rules and budgets). 
199.  From the perspective of Posner and Vermeule, this state of affairs may be inevitable and 
even desirable, but most others are far less sanguine. Cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 197, at 
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about the allocation of authority, this state of affairs also undermines the 
legitimacy of crisis-era interventions in ways that can contribute to public 
distrust. One of the early manifestations of the populism that has swept 
much of the globe was the Occupy Wall Street movement, which embodied 
broadly held perceptions that policymakers had bailed out Wall Street while 
doing too little for Main Street.200 That movement is now giving rise to a 
host of policy changes that includes greater protectionism and new limits on 
immigration.201 Both by enabling a greater role for Congress and by 
allowing greater two-way communication with the public, the EGA could 
set the stage for a process in which the long-term response does more to 
address the fairness and other issues that crises inevitably pose. 
The effort to utilize the unique capabilities of the Executive without 
excessively compromising democratic legitimacy serves to again highlight 
why the limits of the EGA are more of a virtue than a drawback. The EGA 
does not provide a magic bullet for inherently difficult questions. It instead 
sets the stage for a process that allows more meaningful engagement by a 
broader swathe of actors in ways suited to their competencies. The EGA 
 
14, 198–200 (“[T]he [framers’] decision to give emergency powers to Congress . . . rather than the 
president, probably did not help forestall a dictatorship. Lincoln violated the clause, and Congress 
acquiesced.”), with Gluck et al., supra note 145 at 1789 (criticizing the broadness of and lack of 
attention paid to emergency legislation). 
200. E.g., Robert L. Borosage, The Populist Moment Has Finally Arrived, NATION (Mar. 23, 
2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/occupy-and-organize/ [https://perma.cc/PQY7-HTPA]; 
Levitin, supra note 51. 
201.  Rogers Brubaker, Populism’s Perfect Storm, BOS. REV. (July 11, 2017), 
http://bostonreview.net/politics/rogers-brubaker-populisms-perfect-storm [https://perma.cc/SB6X-
G8JU]. 
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provides the executive branch with a great deal of authority and discretion, 
consistent with Posner and Vermeule’s assessment of what emergencies 
require. At the same time, the Secretary can invoke the EGA only after 
determining that legislatively numerated conditions have been satisfied, and 
congressional approval remains a prerequisite to the provision of fresh 
capital, structural reforms, longer term guarantees, or other more 
substantive interventions that are likely to be necessary to achieve lasting 
stability. After the crisis has been resolved, it will also be in the hands of 
Congress to determine whether an industry has been sufficiently reformed 
such that the EGA should be reauthorized if previously used to support that 
industry. Although the EGA can by no means assure procedural perfection 
any more than it can guarantee an outcome that perfectly balances stability 
and fairness, the EGA sets the stage for a more appropriate allocation of 
authority in light of the nature of the institutions involved. 
2. Within the Executive.—Both because of the explosion in the size of 
the administrative state today relative to the country’s founding and because 
there are carefully delineated mechanisms within the administrative state 
that affect the degree of presidential control and political responsiveness of 
various administrative actors, it is important to also explain why a particular 
actor within the executive—here, the Treasury Secretary, in consultation 
with the President—should make a particular determination. 
In some ways, the Federal Reserve might seem like the more suitable 
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body to have this authority. Central banks have a long history of helping to 
restore calm during periods of panic and the Federal Reserve likely has 
more of the information and expertise that will be needed to address an 
unfolding crisis than the Treasury.202 For these reasons, the Fed very likely 
will be deeply involved in any invocation of the EGA. Formally, it will 
have the ability to trigger consideration of whether the EGA should be 
invoked, and it may also be empowered to play a meaningful, even possibly 
lead, role in implementation. The Crisis, however, and the backlash to it, 
brought to life the challenges of having a central bank play too great a role 
in crisis management. 
The Federal Reserve, like other central banks, is structured so as to 
provide it greater independence than any other federal agency, with 
protections including effective control over its budget, exceptionally long 
terms for each of the governors, the inability of governors to be removed 
other than for cause, and limited judicial review of its decisions.203 This 
independence is justified on the basis that one of the Fed’s most important 
 
202. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & Dep’t of the Treasury, The 
Role of the Federal Reserve in Preserving Financial and Monetary Stability Joint Statement by the 
Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve (Mar. 23, 2009), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20090323b.htm 
[https://perma.cc/K4UT-8PEC]. 
203.  Judge, supra note 20, at 65–67; Charles I. Plosser, The Importance of a Regional and 
Independent Federal Reserve, in Fed. Reserve Bank of Pa., Out of Many. . . One: 2009 Annual 
Report 8, 8–9, 12–13 (2009), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/publications/annual-
report/2009/2009-annual-report.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/Z3GL-9SKL]; Who Are the Members 
of the Federal Reserve Board, and How Are They Selected?, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12591.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6K7M-F336]. 
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functions is monetary policy, and to implement that function in the way that 
best serves the long-term interests of the country, the Fed must sometimes 
make decisions that entail short-term costs. Empirical work supports the 
notion that time consistency justifies central bank independence when it 
comes to monetary policy.204 
Central bank independence is relevant here in two ways. On a 
pragmatic level, having a central bank take actions that have salient 
distribution consequences sets the stage for backlash that might threaten its 
capacity to remain independent even when exercising its monetary 
authority.205 As Kevin Warsh, a Fed Governor, noted in late 2008: “The 
circumstances of . . . [2008] caused us to cross more lines than this 
 
204.  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Speech at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies 
International Conference: Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability, Bank of 
Japan, Tokyo, Japan (May 26, 2010), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100525a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8FSV-YMV6]; see also Rosa M. Lastra & Geoffrey P. Miller, Central Bank 
Independence in Ordinary and Extraordinary Times, in CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: THE 
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS, AND DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 31, 31–33 (Jan Kleineman ed., 2001) (stating that there is evidence that 
independent central banks maintain price stability better than non-independent central banks); 
Alberto Alesina & Lawrence Summers, Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic 
Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 151, 151–52 
(1993) (stating that “insulating monetary policy from the political process” avoids time-
inconsistency problems and enforces low-inflation equilibriums); Frederic S. Mishkin, Monetary 
Policy Strategy: Lessons From the Crisis 8–10 (Feb. 2011) (Nat. Bureau of Econ. Res., Working 
Paper No. 16755), https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2011/res2/pdf/fm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2XZ9-JVY3] (stating time-inconsistent policies can lead to worse outcomes than 
predictable rules, and central bank independence avoids the problem and improves 
macroeconomic performance). 
205. Zoe Thomas, Why Do Many Americans Mistrust the Federal Reserve?, BBC NEWS 
(Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-35079495 [https://perma.cc/HET9-K6PH]; 
see also Andrew Flowers & Harry Enten, The Fed Has Never Been More Polarizing, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 24, 2015), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-fed-has-never-been-
more-polarizing/ [https://perma.cc/H34W-SVKT] (showing that there was a precipitous decline in 
public support for the Fed in the years before and during the crisis, and while support among 
Democrats has started to rebound, it has continued to wane among Republicans). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247265 
GOLR 2.11.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/19  3:02 PM 
184 Texas Law Review [Vol. XX:ppp 
institution has crossed in the previous seventy years.”206 The public noticed. 
When Alan Greenspan left his position as Chair of the Fed in 2006, he 
enjoyed an approval rating between 65% and 72%.207 By contrast, when 
Ben Bernanke completed his term as Chair, his approval rating was a mere 
40%, and his approval rating was even lower among Americans who made 
less than $60,000 a year.208 
The Federal Reserve as an institution fares even worse. In 2015, just 
one-third of Americans felt that the Fed was doing a good or an excellent 
job—a rating that puts the Federal Reserve second to the bottom among all 
federal agencies.209 Only the IRS is less well-liked.210 In light of recent 
electoral upsets and meaningful efforts from both sides of the political 
spectrum to reduce the Fed’s autonomy, these developments cannot be 
dismissed. There is a long history of American distrust of central banking 
that has resulted in the demise of more than one of the nation’s central 
banks.211 
 
206. Cassidy, supra note 143. 
207. Sarah Binder, Why It Matters What the Public Thinks about Janet Yellen, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/11/why-it-
matters-what-the-public-thinks-about-janet-yellen/?utm_term=.d68735547739 
[https://perma.cc/LW7G-GWA4] (showing the results of the various polls conducted); Thomas, 
supra note 203 (stating that Greenspan’s approval rating was 72% in 2006). 
208. Andrew Dugan, Fed Chairman Bernanke Leaves with Mixed Verdict, GALLUP (Jan. 29, 
2014), https://news.gallup.com/poll/167099/fed-chairman-bernanke-leaves-mixed-verdict.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/Y6T8-3MMT]. 
209. Thomas, supra note 205. 
210. Id. 
211. E.g., SCOTT, supra note 29, at 80–88 (describing the rise and fall of the First and Second 
National Banks of the United States and the controversy surrounding the creation of the Federal 
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Just as importantly, giving the central bank authority to make these 
types of decisions is hard to justify normatively. When shifting from 
monetary policy to financial regulation, there is far less theoretical support 
for the notion that a central bank should be making decisions with 
significant allocation implications, and emergency-era interventions 
inevitably have effects on allocation. The Treasury Secretary is a member 
of the President’s Cabinet and is expected to work far more closely with, 
and under the guidance of, the President than an independent agency.212 
This is part of the reason that the Treasury Secretary has frequently been the 
one empowered to make systemic risk and liquidity determinations and to 
play a central role in authorizing interventions to stabilize the financial 
system.213 This by no means assures legitimacy, but it enhances 
accountability by ensuring that the EGA can never be invoked without 
direct consultation with the most powerful elected official. 
Putting these pieces together, having the Treasury Secretary serve as 
 
Reserve). 
212. The Executive Branch, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-
white-house/the-executive-branch/ [https://perma.cc/7WCX-SXC4]. 
213.  E.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343 § 2, 122 
Stat. 3765, 3766 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2012)) (stating the purpose of the Act is to 
“immediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore 
liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States”); Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289 §§ 1101, 1118, 122 Stat. 2654, 2661–62, 2688 (2006) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4511, 4513) (authorizing the Secretary to place Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac into conservatorship or receivership); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Fannie and 
Freddie’s Government Rescue Has Come with Claws, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/business/fannie-and-freddies-government-rescue-has-come-
with-claws.html [https://perma.cc/6YTK-EE9F] (describing events leading up to and following 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac being taken into conservatorship). 
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the key instigator and having the Treasury Department directly bear the 
economic risk allows the Federal Reserve to focus on traditional central 
banking. Reducing pressure on the Fed to stretch its authority is important 
on both pragmatic and normative grounds. Simultaneously increasing the 
pressure on the Treasury to take a lead in making difficult decisions further 
improves democratic legitimacy relative to the current, inadvertent status 
quo. 
D.  Dynamism 
The final feature worth highlighting is the capacity of the EGA to 
address challenges even when they arise outside of the regulated sphere. 
Today’s banking system, at least in the United States, is far better 
capitalized than it was prior to the Crisis.214 From the Fed’s discount 
window to the possibility of FDIC guarantees, there are also a number of ex 
post tools that remain available to mitigate a crisis as it afflicts formal 
banks. The EGA should be available for banks when appropriate, and the 
banking system is often implicated—whether by interconnections or 
common exposures—even when problems first arise elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, the primary rationale for institutionalizing something as broad 
as the EGA is not the banking sector. 
 
214. Roger Lowenstein, A Legacy of the Financial Crisis? The Makings of the Next One, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-legacy-of-
the-financial-crisis-the-makings-of-the-next-one/2018/09/07/de26aa46-af0c-11e8-a20b-
5f4f84429666_story.html?utm_term=.97c971c00533 [https://perma.cc/YW9N-RSL3]. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247265 
GOLR 2.11.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/19  3:02 PM 
201x] Guarantor of Last Resort 187 
The reason the EGA is such a critical addition to the current crisis-
management toolkit is the inevitable dynamism of financial markets, and 
the possibility of institutions arising  that may not be seen as systemically 
important until a crisis actually strikes. Although the particular system of 
market-based intermediation known today as the “shadow banking system” 
is a recent phenomenon, the pattern of short-term debt creation migrating 
outside the banking system and instability arising in those domains has been 
repeated throughout history.215 The dynamism of finance makes this 
challenge inevitable. As explained in a recent IMF report on regulating for 
systemic stability: “Some (perhaps many) risks though will remain 
undiscovered, not just because of a lack of attention by markets, 
supervisory agencies and others, but because they are not easily 
recognizable. Indeed, sometimes these (system) risks of a (new) product are 
not even known by the purveyor.”216 
Recognizing the inherent dynamism of financial markets and the 
inevitability of fragility outside the direct purview of prudential regulators 
affirms the critical need for crisis-management instruments that can be 
deployed outside the regulated space. The EGA has this capacity. It enables 
 
215. Rockoff, supra note 65, at 3 (examining the dozen financial panics that occurred in the 
United States from the Panic of 1819 through the Crisis and finding that “[t]ypically, panics were 
started by a cluster of failures in which shadow banks played a prominent role”). 
216.  Stijn Claessens & Laura Kodres, The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial 
Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions 13 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/14/46, 
2014), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/The-Regulatory-Responses-to-
the-Global-Financial-Crisis-Some-Uncomfortable-Questions-41422 [https://perma.cc/NG57-
7ZYU]. 
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financial regulators to target problems at their source, wherever that may 
be. This allows regulators to develop responses that are more closely 
tailored to the ends they are trying to achieve, potentially reducing the 
temptation to stretch other sources of authority. It also allows them to 
demand information from entities they do not otherwise oversee, allowing 
them to more quickly devise a comprehensive understanding of where 
losses lie and the challenges underlying the panic.217 Although discussed 
last, this flexibility may be the greatest virtue of the EGA. 
E.  Creativity and Risk Taking 
One of the core ways that the EGA here proposed differs from current 
emergency-era authority in the United States and most places is in its 
breadth. Beyond allowing regulators the capacity to address problems that 
arise outside the regulated sphere, this scope can also make it easier for 
regulators to use the tools available when problems arise in that sphere. 
Consider, for example, the ongoing questions about whether a bank holding 
company with seemingly sufficient loss-absorbing capital and a recently 
refreshed living will can go through a bankruptcy proceeding without 
recreating the fallout that followed Lehman’s failure. Most agree that long-
 
217.  For more on the value of having regulators provide emergency-era support to nonbanks 
in exchange for information, see Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of 
Last Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 843 (2016). 
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term, moral hazard might be far better contained if it could.218 And, at least 
in theory, such an institution should be far more capable of orderly 
resolution today than it was a decade ago. Nonetheless, pressing questions 
remain about whether a bankruptcy proceeding will actually work as hoped, 
leading to ongoing fears that regulators may lack the courage to give it a 
try. After Lehman Brothers, regulators may be understandably hesitant to 
just give it a try and hope for the best, even if probabilistically, it looks like 
it should work. 
The EGA changes that calculus. A Treasury Secretary discussing 
options with other lead regulators could now be assured that if something 
equivalent to the Primary Reserve Fund’s breaking the buck were to occur 
despite their best planning, he could respond swiftly and powerfully to 
contain that additional fallout. Additionally, the Secretary could announce 
an intention to use that authority to contain any further fallout 
simultaneously with the announcement of the bankruptcy, further reducing 
the likelihood of panic and disruption. Without getting too Pollyanna and 
suggesting the very existence of the EGA will make it possible never to 
need it, the claim here is that the benefits of the EGA go beyond situations 
when it is used. Just like a lender of last resort, there are likely to be some 
 
218. See David A. Skeel Jr., Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative, in ACROSS 
THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 315–16 (Martin N. Bailey & 
John B. Taylor eds., 2014) (recognizing that Lehman failed to plan for bankruptcy because it 
expected a bailout, which led to significant monetary losses). 
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circumstances when just having an EGA can help calm markets and give 
regulators the backbone to take the types of risks that can be crucial to 
reducing the moral hazard concerns that arise after a crisis. 
V.  Some Counter-Arguments 
A.  Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard may be the biggest reason not to adopt the EGA. Giving 
the Treasury Secretary broad guarantee authority may incline financial 
institutions to assume greater risks and might weaken the market discipline 
that counterparties and creditors would otherwise impose. Although there is 
deep disagreement about whether and to what extent moral hazard is a 
problem, there are good reasons for concern.219 If market participants 
anticipate being protected from certain downsides, this can alter their 
propensity to monitor and limit risk in troubling ways. 
As a starting point, the EGA here proposed is meant to complement, 
not displace the massive system of ex ante regulation currently in place. 
Once institutions or activities are revealed to be meaningful sources of 
systemic risk, it is critical to develop appropriate mechanisms of prudential 
regulation and oversight to mitigate or force internalization of the 
associated externalities. The assumption that such regulation will be 
 
219. For a summary of the mixed views on moral hazard, see Posner, supra note 24, at 1540 
n.35 and sources cited therein. 
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incomplete is not to disregard its critical importance.  
Additionally, assessing the myriad ways that an EGA might alter 
incentives requires starting with an appropriate baseline. The baseline today 
is not a world in which market forces operate without any government 
interference or where those interventions will be limited to what the law 
currently allows.220 Because of the externalities that runs and failures can 
trigger, the government cannot credibly commit to not intervene in the face 
of disaster.221 The EGA adds structure and discipline in its mandatory 
elements, and, by giving the Secretary broad authority to intervene when 
needed, it might actually make it easier for regulators to take the chance of 
allowing an institution to fail when the ramifications of that failure are 
unknown. 
Also important are the ways the mandatory procedural limits reduce 
moral hazard and could facilitate the path to reform. Because the EGA can 
only be invoked when the Treasury Secretary determines that there is a 
sufficient threat to the functioning of the financial system as a whole, 
idiosyncratic risk should remain subject to significant market discipline. 
The temporal limit on the EGA means that it cannot be used to solve or 
avoid capital deficiencies. Additionally, the requirement that the EGA, once 
 
220. See supra subpart II(A).. 
221. See Charles W. Calomiris et al., Establishing Credible Rules for Fed Emergency 
Lending, 9 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 260, 262 (2017) (concluding that externalities arising from events 
threatening financial institutions have the capacity to destroy the entire financial system). 
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invoked, cannot again be used to protect the same class of claimants 
provides institutions a strong incentive never to put themselves in a 
situation where the EGA would need to be used to protect their claimants. 
Once government support is needed, the industry or firm receiving support 
will likely face a long-term choice between inviting massive reform (in 
order to justify having Congress re-extend the possibility of protection) or 
demise. 
Apart from the statutorily imposed limits on when the EGA will be 
invoked, the Secretary could further mitigate the moral hazard by providing 
guidelines regarding when and how the Secretary anticipates using the 
EGA. A classic maxim in financial regulation is that regulators should 
allow the first bank to fail and save all of the others.222 This creates healthy 
discipline during normal times because no bank wants to take greater risks 
than others, particularly if banks understand that this is the policy they will 
face. This advice was not followed in the Crisis, perhaps because regulators 
lacked clear authority to limit the knock-on effects that one bank’s failure 
might trigger. Nonetheless, with the EGA, a Secretary could issue guidance 
or otherwise indicate an intention to follow this type of procedure, putting 
firms on notice that failure is an option because (rather than despite) of the 
existence of the EGA. 
 
222. See Joel Shapiro & David Skeie, Information Management in Banking Crises, 28 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 2322, 2323 (2015) (discussing a regulator’s incentive to build a reputation with the 
first bank so subsequent banks are put on notice that they may not be bailed out). 
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There is no way to know in advance precisely how the EGA will be 
utilized by any particular administration. It is impossible to deny that 
vesting this type of authority in an executive body could lead to abuse. But 
the same political accountability that enables the possibility of abuse could 
also prove remarkably effective at limiting excess use of other regulatory 
tools (like an overly lax lender of last resort) and reducing expectations that 
Congress will jump in and grant broad executive authority to save all 
distressed firms. Starting with a realistic baseline that recognizes that 
market participants already expect significant government support in the 
event of systemic distress shows why the EGA may well reduce the 
aggregate moral hazard in the system. 
B.  Fairness 
Two related issues that have received significant attention in the wake 
of the Crisis are unfairness and perceptions of unfairness. With the 
exception of Lehman Brothers, the government did not allow a single major 
financial institution to fail.223 This approach may have been effective in 
helping to contain the growing crisis, but it also bestowed a significant 
largesse on their employees, creditors, and other stakeholders. Efforts to 
help homeowners, meanwhile, provided far less aid than originally 
 
223. James B. Stewart & Peter Eavis, Revisiting the Lehman Brothers Bailout That Never 
Was, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2014) https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/business/revisiting-the-
lehman-brothers-bailout-that-never-was.html [https://perma.cc/DBB3-P4ZB]. 
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promised,224 even though providing greater aid to homeowners and 
otherwise reducing the debt burden of average Americans may have been 
an effective way to reduce the size of the recession following the Crisis.225 
That even less was done to help those who lost jobs or had their retirement 
savings wiped out led to a widespread perception that regulators intervened 
to help Wall Street but not Main Street.226 
These are important concerns that merit center stage in devising the 
government’s response to the next financial crisis. They are, however, only 
tangentially related to the proposal here. The EGA is designed to stop the 
bleeding and provide policymakers the breathing room required to devise a 
plan for addressing underlying deficiencies and improving the 
macroeconomic outlook; it says nothing about what that plan should look 
 
224. E.g., CHRISTY G. ROMERO, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE 
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: JANUARY 27, 2016, 
74–76 (2016) (describing the frequency of wrongful terminations of homeowners by servicers 
participating in HAMP); CHRISTY L. ROMERO, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE 
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: JULY 29, 2015, 101–
08 (2015) (showing that 70% of mortgagees who applied for HAMP were turned down and raising 
a host of other questions about the efficacy of the program); David Dayen, The Government 
Program that Failed Homeowners, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/mar/30/government-program-save-homes-mortgages-
failure-banks [https://perma.cc/C9GU-GJB3] (explaining that five years after the launch of HAMP 
“[f]ewer than one million homeowners remain in the . . . program – just a quarter of its target – 
and $28bn of the funding remains unspent” and further noting that of the 1.3 million who did 
receive permanent modifications to the terms of their mortgage, “350,000 of them defaulted 
again . . . and were evicted from their homes”). 
225. ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT 
RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 142, 145–48, 163 (2014) 
(“The most effective policy puts cash into the hands of those who will spend the most of it, and 
indebted home owners have an extremely high marginal propensity to consume.”). 
226. See Nin-Hai Tseng, The Bailout Wall Street Is Blocking from Main Street, FORTUNE 
(Aug. 9, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/08/09/the-bailout-wall-street-is-blocking-from-main-
street/ [https://perma.cc/2R2X-AENC] (noting that unlike Wall Street, “Main Street never got” a 
bailout). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247265 
GOLR 2.11.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/19  3:02 PM 
201x] Guarantor of Last Resort 195 
like. The inherently finite nature of the EGA ensures that apart from 
circumstances where the underlying problems are truly modest in nature, 
further action will be required. Those actions could entail providing capital 
support to banks and other large firms, as happened during the Crisis, or 
providing debt relief to homeowners or other borrowers, a path that could 
have been but was not taken during the Crisis.227 It is true that the EGA will 
likely be deployed to protect the stability of fragile financial institutions that 
may have played a role in contributing to the Crisis, but having in place a 
time-limited tool to stop the bleeding makes it possible for elected officials 
and others concerned with fairness and legitimacy to devise a long-term 
solution that takes those considerations into account. 
C.  Credit Risk 
Another concern is that guaranteeing financial claims entails credit 
risk. Given the potential scale of the programs envisioned and the potential 
need for the Treasury to respond with limited information regarding the 
quality of the underlying assets, the credit risk could be substantial. This is 
a legitimate concern, and one of the reasons that the Treasury Department, 
and not the Federal Reserve, should control the EGA. In contrast to 
idealized notions of how a lender of last resort might work, the guarantees 
here envisioned could entail fiscal judgments. These are the type of 
 
227. For a discussion of the tradeoffs of these different approaches, see MIAN & SUFI, supra 
note 223, at 122–26, 142, 145–48. 
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decisions best made by more politically accountable actors. 
In practice, the magnitude of credit risk may well be quite modest 
relative to the claims insured. For example, in November 2008, at the height 
of its efforts to contain the Crisis, the Federal Reserve had extended more 
than $710 billion in credit pursuant to its authority to lend money to non-
bank institutions under unusual and exigent circumstances.228 As of January 
2016, the Federal Reserve had earned more than $30 billion on those loans 
while incurring no losses.229 The crisis-era investments by the Treasury 
Department under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) did entail 
some losses, but on net yielded more than $15 billion in profits for the U.S. 
government, a far cry from the large losses many predicted initially.230 This 
does not necessarily mean that the government was compensated fully in 
light of the magnitude of the credit risk that it assumed.231 Nonetheless, 
 
228. Labonte, supra note 111, at 1–2. This authority is somewhat akin to the use of the EGA 
in that in contrast to the Federal Reserve’s discount window lending to banks, these loans are not 
made in connection with the prudential oversight of the Federal Reserve and other bank 
regulators. 
229. Id. at 2. 
230. Russell Berman, The U.S. Made $15 Billion from Bailouts, ATLANTIC (Dec. 19, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/treasury-announces-sale-ally-financial-
stock-end-of-tarp-program/383939/ [https://perma.cc/XF77-TLG2]. The most recent data is 
available at Monthly Report to Congress, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/Monthly-Report-to-
Congress.aspx [https://perma.cc/H2HP-F7RV]. 
231. E.g., Matt Palumbo, Overselling TARP: The Myth of the $15 Billion Profit, NAT’L REV. 
(Jan. 6, 2015), https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/01/overselling-tarp-myth-15-billion-profit-
matt-palumbo/ [https://perma.cc/9FSM-LTKZ] (noting that “while a profit of $15 billion sounds 
enormous, it only amounts to a nominal annualized return of 0.6 percent”); Jonathan Weisman, 
U.S. Declares Bank and Auto Bailouts Over, and Profitable, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/business/us-signals-end-of-bailouts-of-automakers-and-
wall-street.html [https://perma.cc/Q92Z-6TDX] (“Given the scale of the broader economic losses 
and the risk the government took to protect Wall Street and Detroit, a $15 billion profit on a $426 
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these figures attest to the fact that the government may be able to provide 
quite significant support during periods of widespread systemic distress 
while exposing taxpayers to modest, if any, losses. More generally, because 
the EGA will generally be deployed to maintain, rather than change, the 
status quo, the government will often be stepping in to assume liquidity or 
other risks that private market participants had been willing to bear up until 
the crisis hit. So long as government intervention is not assumed 
irrespective of circumstance, and the EGA makes that unlikely, the market 
discipline at play outside of crisis periods should help mitigate the credit 
risk to which the government is exposed once crisis hits. 
More importantly, the credit risk associated with the EGA is more of 
an issue of how it should be deployed rather than whether it should be 
adopted. The government regularly spends money in a variety of ways. The 
question is not whether there is a fiscal component to a broad guarantee 
scheme but whether it is justified in light of the expected benefits. Given 
the informational dynamics, these types of calculations may be speculative 
but they do provide a meaningful framework that can be used to address the 
relevant question, which is not whether there is credit risk but whether that 
credit risk is justified. 
 
billion investment is nothing to celebrate, said [MIT economist] Simon Johnson . . . .”). 
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D.  Funding and Other Implementation Challenges 
The issue of credit risk also implicates another challenge: How to fund 
the EGA should the Treasury need to make good on guarantees in excess of 
any fees the program might earn. A related issue is whether the debt ceiling 
might become an issue. Although the Treasury’s use of the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund to backstop money market mutual funds demonstrates 
that guarantees can be effective even when the assets backing the guarantee 
are dwarfed by the value of the claims covered, there is some limit.232 These 
are but two of the range of issues that might arise in connection with 
adopting and implementing the EGA as proposed here. 
Some of these challenges, like the debt ceiling, arise from potential 
conflicts between the EGA and other laws. Another domain where these 
types of issues might arise relates to information. There are meaningful 
restrictions on how information can be shared among government agencies 
and procedural hurdles on the government’s capacity to demand 
information from firms, creating frictions that would need to be addressed 
for the EGA to work as intended.233 To the extent these types of challenges 
are foreseeable, it may be possible to address them as part of the 
implementing legislation. That said, there are likely to be issues that are not 
 
232. Macey, supra note 100, at 149–50. 
233. See Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2012) (enumerating conditions 
that federal agencies must follow to collect and share information). 
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as foreseeable or not subject to clean, ex ante resolution.234 These will most 
likely need to be addressed during implementation. For example, due 
process concerns might be addressed by extending guarantees directly to the 
holders of certain types of financial claims without imposing any 
obligations on the issuer if the issuer does not consent and it is determined 
that this mode of intervention is justified by systemic considerations. 
There could well be a host of other issues that arise during 
implementation. For example, to succeed in halting a run, the EGA must be 
implemented in a manner that addresses liquidity risk, not just credit risk. If 
short-term creditors expect that they will have to wait months to be paid, 
even if eventually paid in full, they may still have an incentive to withdraw 
short-term funds. Similarly, there are logistical challenges inherent in 
seeking to make the EGA one part of an overall scheme that entails 
gathering the information required to identify and address underlying 
weaknesses. These considerations cannot be fully addressed in advance, but 
they do raise a number of issues that can be mitigated through appropriate 
advance planning. 
As a starting point, the EGA specifically envisions that other financial 
regulators will play important roles alongside the Treasury Department. 
 
234. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation 
Authority: Too Big for the Constitution?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 173–74 (2014) (discussing 
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and arguing that the legislation raises multiple constitutional 
questions). 
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Although the Treasury Secretary must make the required systemic risk 
determinations and the Treasury Department bears the credit risk should the 
guarantees ultimately result in any losses, other regulators can prompt 
consideration of whether a class of claimants should be protected and other 
regulators can help with implementation. Other regulators will likely also 
play critical roles in implementation. In this regard, the EGA is not all that 
different than the current Orderly Liquidation Authority, which must be 
approved by the Treasury Secretary and depends on liquidity and credit 
provided by the Treasury Department, but which is implemented primarily 
by the FDIC.235 The Federal Reserve is also likely to play a prominent role 
in implementation of the EGA and in the process of identifying and 
addressing the deficiencies threatening the system. Given the patchwork 
nature of the financial-regulatory architecture in the United States, this type 
of coordination is unavoidable even if challenging. 
Enhancing the Treasury Secretary’s ability to work closely with other 
regulators in both determining whether to invoke the EGA and 
implementing any guarantees if adopted is the Secretary’s position as the 
head of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The leaders of 
all of the important federal financial regulators are FSOC members, and the 
FSOC is specifically charged with identifying and helping to address 
 
235. Aaron Klein, A Primer on Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority, BROOKINGS: 
UP FRONT (June 5, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/06/05/a-primer-on-
dodd-franks-orderly-liquidation-authority/ [https://perma.cc/25X8-A83E]. 
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systemic risk. In addition to affirming the expectation that the Treasury 
Department play a central role in promoting systemic stability, the 
Secretary’s role as head of FSOC puts her in the position to ensure that the 
EGA is implemented in a manner that complements other efforts underway 
by other financial regulators to address the burgeoning crisis the Secretary 
seeks to help contain. 
None of this is to ignore the significant challenges that will exist to 
ensuring that the EGA can work and will work as envisioned. Some 
additional progress can be made through ongoing monitoring, advanced 
planning, and ramping up information gathering even in response to soft 
signals that something is amiss. The EGA is not a tool that should be 
ignored entirely until crisis hits. Ongoing diligence and advanced planning 
are critical. At the same time, one reason for the EGA is the inevitable 
dynamism of the financial system. It allows regulators to respond to contain 
a crisis even when risks arise in unexpected places or propagate in 
unexpected ways. Accordingly, any advanced planning and guidance 
should serve as a starting point rather than a straitjacket when the time 
comes to invoke the EGA. 
Conclusion 
A guarantor of last resort will not prevent the next crisis. But a 
guarantor of last resort should improve the prospects, both in terms of 
macroeconomic outcome and accountability, when that crisis strikes. An 
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EGA enables policymakers to contain a crisis in a timely fashion, reducing 
the spillover effects on the real economy. It also denies policymakers the 
option of putting off the difficult task of identifying and addressing the 
underlying problems, further mitigating the macroeconomic costs. Just as 
importantly, the EGA proposed here would enable regulators to respond 
irrespective of where the next crisis erupts, addressing the inevitable 
dynamism of financial markets. And it would help to restore a more 
appropriate balance of power between Congress and the President and 
within the executive branch. 
The EGA is not a first-best solution to financial fragility. It will not 
stop the next crisis or cause moral hazard to disappear. Nor will it address 
the fairness concerns that so often arise when the steps required to bring 
about stability benefit the same financial market participants who helped 
create the fragility. But the EGA does belie the fiction that there is always a 
tradeoff between resilience and accountability. By creating an emergency-
era regime that brings with it internal mechanisms for producing and 
transmitting information and passing authority among policymaking bodies 
at intervals reflecting their capacity and competence, a guarantor of last 
resort can promote both. 
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